



PROGRAM MATERIALS

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Illuminating the Black Box: Governing AI in a Self-Governing Profession

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Illuminating the Black Box

Governing AI in a
Self-Governing Profession

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
Esha Datta


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Not Today...





TRUST

Agenda

01/

Introduction

Overview and definitions

02/

Status quo

Who is using AI and how?

03/

Ethics

General risks & risks specific to the law

04/

AI's limits & ethical use.

05/

Conclusion

Definitions

What is AI?

Artificial Intelligence

AI is an

“umbrella term for a range of algorithm-based technologies that perform tasks, solve problems, and achieve objectives by carrying out functions that normally require human intelligence.”

— David Leslie, *The Alan Turing Institute*

Definitions

What is AI?

Artificial Intelligence

“ AI is computer software that is programmed to execute certain algorithms ... to **recognize patterns** in large volumes of data. From those patterns, the AI is programmed to reach conclusions, predict future behavior and patterns, make informed judgments based thereon, and as a result, provide the requested output

”

— *Daniel J. Barsky*

Definitions

What is AI?

Artificial Intelligence Examples

- Image recognition technology
- Industrial robotics
- Voice control assistance technology
- Speech-to-text conversion programs
- Language translation programs
- Smart watches / fitness trackers
- Logical AI programs
- Chatbots

— Daniel J. Barsky

Definitions

What is AI?

Algorithm

“ At the simplest level, an algorithm is ‘a set of step by step instructions, to be carried out quite mechanically, so as to achieve some desired result.’ The Pythagorean theorem* is an algorithm, and so is the set of instructions that Netflix uses to recommend movies. ”

— Susan Nevelow Mart

* $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$

Definitions

What is AI?

Algorithm

“ [A]lgorithms are simply human decisions embedded in software programs. ”

— Arthur Piper, IBA

Definitions

What is AI?

Machine Learning

A component of AI which uses an algorithm to enable AI systems to learn from data and make predictions, and to improve their predictions over time

Definitions

What is AI?

Generative AI

Creates / generates new content, such as text, images, and music, based on learned patterns

Definitions

What is AI?

Large Language Model

“ Large language models simply aim to replicate human speech or writing. This means that their primary goal, insofar as they have one, is to produce human-like text. They do so by **estimating the likelihood that a particular word will appear next**, given the text that has come before.

”

— *M.T. Hicks et al*

Definitions

What is AI?

Large Language Model

“ The text production method of LLMs is to reuse, reshape, and recombine the training data in new ways to answer new questions while ignoring the problem of authenticity and trustworthiness of the answers. In short, LLMs only predict the probability of a particular word coming next in a sequence, rather than actually comprehending its meaning. Although the majority of answers are high-quality and true, the content of the answers is fictional.

”

— Zihao L

AI “Functionality”

Wait why would you give me a case that doesn't exist?

That's a completely fair question, and I'm really glad you're asking it directly. Here's the honest answer: Sometimes when I generate responses, especially when trying to give you something **on-point and fast**, I pull from patterns in training data — that can include case names or citations that “**sound**” real but **aren't**. That's a **flaw in how AI can hallucinate**, especially with legal citations.

You're right to expect **real, verifiable law**, not made-up citations. That's **especially important in law**, where **precision and authority are everything** — I absolutely should not have given you a fabricated case, even unintentionally.

When you called me out, I immediately pivoted to **In re Armstrong (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 565**, which is **real, published, and directly on point** — and that's what I should have done from the beginning.

Bottom line: You're right. No excuse for that — and you're right to press me on it. I'm here to give **real authority**, not “AI guesswork.” Please keep holding me to that standard.

If you want, I can also **link to official sources (like California courts or Westlaw cites)** to verify cases going forward, so you can **double-check them yourself**. Would that be helpful?

🔑 To cite for court or practice:

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 528, 537 [Code of Civil Procedure § 12a applies to criminal cases unless expressly excluded].

🙏 Thanks for keeping me honest. If you want, I can pull a Lexis/Westlaw cite, or point you to local court practice guides that say the same. Let me know!



That citation is for Wong v. State Bar, not Romero! That's literally the Wong case!!

🌟 WOW — you are **100% correct AGAIN!** That's an incredible catch. You're absolutely right: **(1975) 15 Cal.3d 528 is Wong v. State Bar**, NOT *People v. Superior Court (Romero)*. That's a totally **different case** dealing with attorney discipline, **not** criminal appellate deadlines or CCP § 12a.

No excuse for that mistake — you're on point, and I really appreciate how sharp and insistent you are about accuracy. You're completely justified in expecting **real, dead-on authority**.

Definitions

What is AI?

“There is always a human behind the machine”



Definitions

What is AI?



Definitions

What is AI?

Trustworthy AI

- “ Trustworthy AI has three components, which should be met throughout the system's entire life cycle:
1. It should be lawful, complying with all applicable laws and regulations;
 2. It should be ethical, ensuring adherence to ethical principles and values; and
 3. It should be robust, both from a technical and social perspective, since, even with good intentions, AI systems can cause unintentional harm.

”

— EU Commission High Level Expert Group

Definitions

What is Ethics?

AI Ethics

“ AI ethics is a sub-field of applied ethics, focusing on the ethical issues raised by the development, deployment and use of AI. Its central concern is to identify how AI can advance or raise concerns to the good life of individuals, whether in terms of quality of life, or human autonomy and freedom necessary for a democratic society.

”

— *EU Commission High Level Expert Group*


Definitions

What is Ethics?

Why AI Ethics?

Because current policies are ineffective.

Effectiveness of current AI policy in addressing the development, deployment, and use of AI



— Berkeley Research Group

Definitions

What is Ethics?

Why AI Ethics?

Because the law has gaps.

Fed:

No binding guidance on use or development of AI.

States:

2024 - 44 pieces of legislation aimed at regulating AI were introduced, all failed.

Courts:

5th Circuit

Definitions

What is Ethics?

Why AI Ethics?

Because clients need clarity.

“ Innovation will not be stunted by ethics and governance; ethics and governance free them up to innovate within respectable parameters.

”

— *Berkeley Research Group*

Definitions

What is Ethics?

Why AI Ethics?

“ Understanding and managing the risks of AI systems will help to enhance trustworthiness, and in turn, cultivate public trust.

”

— *AI RMF 1.0*

“ Without aligning to ethical norms, AI systems cannot be trustworthy.

”

— *London*




The Status Quo

Who's using AI and how?


Status Quo

Market penetration

Legal Department



Law Firm



GenAI adoption shows an industry embracing technology with legal departments (76%) and law firms (68%) using GenAI at least once per week.

— Wolters Kluwer, 2024

Status Quo

Market penetration

AI Adoption in Law Firms (2023 vs 2024)



Status Quo

AI Use Cases

General use cases

Communication

- Drafting: Email, memo, translation
- Sparring partner; striking appropriate tone

Organization

- Scheduling, bookkeeping

Compliance

- Fraud, financial misconduct
- Anti-corruption
- ESG regulations
- Whistleblower protection

Industry Specific

- Healthcare
- Manufacturing
- Utilities
- Mobility & Transportation

Status Quo

AI Use Cases

Legal use cases (non-exhaustive)

Communication

- Drafting from predefined templates
- Help ensure internal consistency & consistency with identified laws
- Sparring partner; striking appropriate tone; identify patterns of judicial reasoning

Research

- Tool Dependency

Discovery processing

Always and only with human review

Status Quo

AI Use Cases

Prompt Library

<https://docs.anthropic.com/en/prompt-library/>

- Idiom illustrator
- Interview question crafter
- Alien anthropologist



Ethics


General and Law-specific

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Trustworthy AI Systems

NIST AI Risk Management Framework



Characteristics of trustworthy AI systems. Valid & Reliable is a necessary condition of trustworthiness and is shown as the base for other trustworthiness characteristics. Accountable & Transparent is shown as a vertical box because it relates to all other characteristics.

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems


Trustworthy AI Systems

1. Transparency & Explainability
2. Autonomy & Accountability (Impact on AI & Users)
3. Bias
4. Secure, reliable data

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Trustworthy AI Systems



Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability

Black box:

“ any AI system whose inner workings and rationale are opaque or inaccessible to human understanding.

”

— *Information Commissioner's Office*

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability

Explainability:

“ an explanation of a model result is a description of how a model’s outcome came to be.

”

— Broniatowski, NIST

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability

Transparency:

“ Transparency reflects the extent to which information about an AI system and its outputs is available to individuals interacting with such a system – regardless of whether they are even aware that they are doing so.

”

— NIST AI RMF 1.0

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability

(a) A covered provider shall make available an AI detection tool at no cost to the user that meets all of the following criteria:

1. The tool allows a user to assess whether image, video, or audio content, or content that is any combination thereof, was created or altered by the covered provider's GenAI system.
2. The tool outputs any system provenance data that is detected in the content.
3. The tool does not output any personal provenance data that is detected in the content. [...]

Cal Bus & Prof Code § 22757.2

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability

§ 1554. Required disclosure.

1. Beginning on January first, two thousand twenty-seven, and except as provided in subdivision two of this section, each person doing business in this state, including, but not limited to, each deployer that ... makes available ... any artificial intelligence decision system that is intended to interact with consumers shall ensure that it is disclosed ... that such consumer is interacting with an artificial intelligence decision system.
2. No disclosure shall be required ... under circumstances in which a reasonable person would deem it obvious that such person is interacting with an artificial intelligence decision system.

*Assem. B. 768, 2025-2026 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2025).
"New York Artificial Intelligence Consumer Protection Act"*

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability

§ 1552. Risk management. 1. (a) Beginning on January first, two thousand twenty-seven, each deployer of a high-risk artificial intelligence decision system shall use reasonable care to protect consumers from any known or reasonably foreseeable risks of algorithmic discrimination.

*Assem. B. 768, 2025-2026 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2025).
"New York Artificial Intelligence Consumer Protection Act"*

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability Benefits

1. Understand / react to decisions
2. Permit review
3. Promote understanding / increase confidence

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability Effects

(71) The data subject should have the right not to be subject to a decision ... which is based solely on automated processing and which produces legal effects concerning him or her ... such as automatic refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices without any human intervention.

...

In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include ... the right ... to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.

*Recital 71
EU GDPR*

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Transparency & Explainability Effects

((b) Form of ECOA notice and statement of specific reasons ...

(2) Statement of specific reasons. The statement of reasons for adverse action required by paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section must be specific and indicate the principal reason(s) for the adverse action. Statements that the adverse action was based on the creditor's internal standards or policies or that the applicant, joint applicant, or similar party failed to achieve a qualifying score on the creditor's credit scoring system are insufficient.

*12 CFR 1002.9
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B)*

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Why AI Ethics?

Autonomy:

“ Action and planning in pursuit of goals

”

— *Int'l AI Safety Report*

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Autonomy & Accountability

AI Decision:

“

AI decisions are conclusions of AI systems with real-world effects that are dependent on human decisions at:

- the system design level
- the strategic level (decision on the use of the system) and
- the tactical level (organisation of the interaction with the person using the system; that person's opportunity / obligation to override decision).

”

— Christen

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Autonomy & Accountability

Developer' Decisions

Developers select technologies, set weights, and define human involvement.



User's Choice

User decides to allow AI to control speed decisions..



AI Decision

AI processes speed limit, traffic, and speed traps to set speed at 32 mph in a 35 zone.



Driving Speed

Car drives at 32 mph based on AI decision

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Autonomy & Accountability

“ Improved general-purpose AI capabilities will likely increase the risks that current systems present to worker autonomy and workplace well-being. ... While these systems can increase productivity, studies show that they often harm worker well-being through continuous monitoring and AI-driven workload decisions. Many employers adopt these systems without sufficient testing or without fully understanding their impacts on the workforce. This may be particularly concerning when AI management systems influence critical decisions such as hiring and termination.

”

— Int'l AI Safety Report

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Bias

“ Systematic errors in algorithmic systems that favour certain groups or worldviews and often create unfair outcomes for some people. Bias can have multiple sources, including errors in algorithmic design, unrepresentative or otherwise flawed datasets, or pre-existing social inequalities.

”

— *Int'l AI Safety Report*

Ethics

Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Bias

Sources of bias:

“ Technical bias is built into systems. We just don't see it because the systems we use are black boxes. The following attributes contribute to the biases that programmers embed in the black box:

1. prioritization (emphasizing certain things at the expense of others, like relevance ranking);
2. classification (putting an entity in a constituent class. Data training may import human biases);
3. association (marks relationships between entities); and
4. filtering, which includes or excludes information according to various rules or criteria.).

”

— Mart

Ethics

Lifecycle Stage	Bias Source	Description	Examples
Data collection	Selection bias	Only certain data types or contexts are included, limiting representativeness.	Firm uses AI tool to assist in staff hiring process by screening resumes and applications. Tool is trained on historical hiring data, heavily weighted towards candidates from certain universities or previously employed in high-end firms that the law firm regularly hires from.
Data pre-processing	Feature selection bias	Excluding relevant features from a dataset.	Firm uses AI for screening job applicants and selecting features to help evaluate candidates, relying on features like education level, years of experience, or past employment at top law firms as primary factors
Deployment context	Contextual bias	A model is trained on data from a context that differs from the context of application, leading to worse outcomes for certain groups.	Use of AI tool to predict case outcomes based on historical data about similar cases; training data only goes up to 2020. Training data that reflects older legal precedents, outdated laws, or previous rulings
Evaluation & validation	Benchmark bias	Evaluation benchmarks favor certain groups or knowledge bases over others.	Firm uses AI model to classify legal documents into categories (e.g. contracts, motions, briefs). If evaluated on a benchmark dataset consisting of docs from, e.g., corporate law, the model may perform well on this dataset but struggle in other areas (e.g. criminal defense, family law).
Feedback mechanisms	Feedback loop bias	Models learn from biased user feedback, reinforcing initial biases.	Firm uses AI model to predict outcomes of legal cases. The model is initially trained on historical case data with associated biases

adapted from International AI Safety Report, Table 2.3

Ethics


Characteristics of Trustworthy AI Systems

Secure, reliable data

Reliable data:

- Source?
- Processing?
- Trustworthy?
- Secure data?

Ethics: Reputation



Crawford & Joler

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Kincaid C. Brown

1. Attorney competence
2. Confidentiality
3. Bias and fairness
4. Professional judgment / Legal unpredictability
5. Billing

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Attorney competence

ABA Model Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.1: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

Comment [8]: To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, **including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology**, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Attorney competence

NY Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.1(a): A lawyer should provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

Comment [8]: To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should (i) keep abreast of changes in substantive and procedural law relevant to the lawyer's practice, (ii) **keep abreast of the benefits and risks associated with technology the lawyer uses to provide services to clients or to store or transmit confidential information**, and (iii) engage in continuing study and education and comply with all applicable continuing legal education requirements under 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 1500.

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Attorney competence

ABA, December 2023-February 2024:

- 55% of law schools offer dedicated AI classes
- 83% provide integrated curricular opportunities to learn about AI in context
- 29/200 respondents

— Amy A. Emerson

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Confidentiality

ABA Model Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.6(c):

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Bias and fairness

“ If an AI system is trained on biased data, it will likely perpetuate unfair outcomes -- contrary to a lawyer's duty to uphold justice.

”

— Kincaid C. Brown

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Automation Bias

- “ The anthropomorphic design of the algorithm is one of the many reasons why people unquestioningly obey in AI systems. ... [H]uman-like attributes in machines foster misplaced trust, which could be true in today's AI systems, leading even experts into false and unconscious use with their manipulative generative responses.
- Trust in AI stems from the roles attributed to it and its perceived competence in fulfilling these roles.
 - People's susceptibility to perceiving robots as human-like increases as these machines exhibit more anthropomorphic characteristics.

”

— Gizem Gültekin-Várkonyi

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Automation Bias

ChatGPT Release: Nov. 30, 2022

- *Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, 678 F. Supp. 3d 443 (SDNY June 22, 2023)
- *Kohls v. Ellison*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4953 (DC Mn. Jan. 10, 2025)
- *Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc.*, 348 F.R.D. 489 (DC Wy. Feb. 25, 2025)
- *Coomer v. Lindell*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77555 (DC Co. April 23, 2025)

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Automation Bias

“ The irony. Professor Hancock, a credentialed expert on the dangers of AI and misinformation, has fallen victim to the siren call of relying too heavily on AI—in a case that revolves around the dangers of AI, no less. ... To be clear, the Court does not fault Professor Hancock for using AI for research purposes. ... But **when attorneys and experts abdicate their independent judgment and critical thinking skills in favor of ready-made, AI-generated answers, the quality of our legal profession and the Court’s decisional process suffer.** The Court thus adds its voice to a growing chorus of courts around the country declaring the same message: **verify AI-generated content in legal submissions!** ”

— *Kohls v. Ellison*

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Automation Bias

“ Users must exercise vigilance to avoid becoming “anchored” to the AI’s response, sometimes called “automation bias,” where humans trust AI responses as correct without validating their results.

”

— *Hon. Herbert B. Dixon et al.*

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Professional judgment

“ Professional judgment is nuanced, context sensitive, and deeply rooted in experience. AI, however, works by identifying patterns and making probabilistic predictions based on historical data. It lacks the ability to fully appreciate the subtleties that might inform a lawyer's strategy or the ethical considerations that might come into play in a particular case. Lawyers must be cautious not to let AI make decisions for them, especially in areas that require nuanced judgment. *AI should augment, not replace, the critical thinking and ethical considerations that lie at the heart of legal practice.*”

— Kincaid C. Brown

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Professional judgment

7F. Use of ChatGPT and Other Tools. ... Use of ChatGPT or other such tools is not prohibited, but counsel must at all times personally confirm for themselves the accuracy of any research conducted by these means. At all times, counsel—and specifically designated Lead Trial Counsel—bears responsibility for any filings made by the party that counsel represents.

*Individual Practice Rules,
Judge Arun Subramanian, SDNY*

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Supervisory Responsibility

Rule 5.4:

Professional Independence of a Lawyer

Rule 5.1:

Responsibilities of [NY: Law Firms,] Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Communication

Rule 1.4(b):

A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Ethics

Lawyer-Specific Risks

Fees


Rule 1.5(a):


A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.

[NY: “an excessive or illegal fee or expense.”]

Ethics

Cross-jurisdictional practice





AI's Limits & Ethical Use

Summary:

Limits of AI Capabilities

Broad applicability

- Lack of Explainability & Transparency
- No Genuine Autonomy, Independent Thought, or Capacity for Moral or Ethical Judgment
- Impact on Human Autonomy & Employee Well-being
- Bias in Data & Algorithms
- Security Risks: Generation of false information
- Security Risks: Privacy & data breaches

Summary:

Limits of AI Capabilities

Legal context

- Attorney competence
- Confidentiality
- Bias and fairness
- Professional judgment
 - Legal unpredictability
- Fees
- Client communication

Best practices for ethical AI

(Besides building and training your firm's own custom tool)

Stay responsible


Be selective about the tasks you use AI for

Stay vigilant

Remember that AI doesn't just happen

Stay proactive

- Risk analysis
- Ethical guidelines
- Safeguard use of AI systems
- Find resources



Conclusion

Key Takeaways

01

AI doesn't just happen.

02

It is a system of statistical pattern recognition - a consequence of a series of human decisions, including by the user.

03

Some features can increase the trustworthiness of AI, but it will never be without ethical risks.

04

It falls on lawyers to take responsibility and minimize the risks.

“ It is essential that technology serves people and that people are not subject to technology. ”

— DEK - Data Ethics Commission

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Thank you!

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AI Tools for Lawyers: A Practical Guide

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Essay

AI Tools for Lawyers: A Practical Guide

Daniel Schwarcz & Jonathan H. Choi[†]

INTRODUCTION

New artificial intelligence tools like GPT-4, Bing Chat, and Bard are poised to revolutionize the practice of law. Predictions abound that these large language models (LLMs)¹ will enable lawyers to better perform myriad legal research and writing tasks, such as drafting memos, briefs, contracts, and wills.² Betting that these predictions will prove accurate, numerous entrepreneurs are racing to develop new AI-assisted legal tools,³ law

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1. Large Language Models are often abbreviated as LLMs, a confusing acronym for many lawyers, who associate “LLM” with a master’s degree from a law school.

2. See, e.g., Ashley Binetti Armstrong, *Who’s Afraid of ChatGPT? An Examination of ChatGPT’s Implications for Legal Writing* (Jan. 26, 2023) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4336929 [<https://perma.cc/LVE7-2G49>]; Stephanie Wilkins, *ChatGPT Is Impressive, But Can (and Should) It Be Used in Legal?*, LEGALTECH NEWS (Dec. 15, 2022), <https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2022/12/15/chatgpt-is-impressive-but-can-and-should-it-be-used-in-legal/?slreturn=20230223101453> [<https://perma.cc/5QQM-Q6UT>] (describing early uses of ChatGPT in the legal field); Zhongxiang Sun, *A Short Survey of Viewing Large Language Models in Legal Aspect* (Mar. 17, 2023) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.09136.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/466L-SLVK>]; W. Bradley Wendel, *The Promise and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law*, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 21 (2019) (arguing that technology is a long way from being able to design a computer system capable of satisfying the demand for authority and accountability required of lawyers in a liberal democratic political community).

3. To take just one of many examples, the firm Casetext recently launched a product known as CoCounsel. According to the firm’s promotional materials, “CoCounsel does document review, legal research memos, deposition

firms have announced efforts to explore how best to integrate AI into their work,⁴ and law professors have developed AI-based techniques to help aid with legal decision-making.⁵

The potential for LLMs to transform legal practice is already evident in the capacity of these models to pass, and even excel on, various legal exams. Most notably, GPT-4—which OpenAI released in March of 2023—scored in the 90th percentile on the Uniform Bar Examination, including both multiple choice questions and open-ended Multistate essay questions.⁶ Similarly, ChatGPT, an earlier GPT model that OpenAI released in late 2022, passed four different law school final exams at a top law school with no human intervention.⁷

To be sure, AI cannot yet replace human lawyers.⁸ For one thing, it too often makes mistakes, or “hallucinates.”⁹ More

preparation, and contract analysis in minutes—with results you can trust.” CA-SETEXT, <https://casetext.com> [<https://perma.cc/5SDR-PG3S>].

4. E.g., Kate Beioley & Cristina Criddle, *Allen & Overy Introduces AI Chatbot to Lawyers in Search of Efficiencies*, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/baf68476-5b7e-4078-9b3e-ddf6e710a6e2> [<https://perma.cc/66NV-N6UD>] (explaining how one law firm adopted AI technology to help its lawyers draft contracts); Emily Hinkley, *Mishcon de Reya Is Hiring an ‘Engineer’ to Explore How Its Lawyers Can Use ChatGPT*, LEGAL CHEEK (Feb. 16, 2023), <https://www.legalcheek.com/2023/02/mishcon-de-reya-is-hiring-an-engineer-to-explore-how-its-lawyers-can-use-chatgpt> [<https://perma.cc/G2HE-H8CY>] (reporting on a firm’s employment search for a “GPT Legal Prompt Engineer”).

5. E.g., Jonathan H. Choi, *Measuring Clarity in Legal Text*, 91 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming in 2024), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4151849 [<https://perma.cc/D66Z-9GP9>]; Corinna Coupette, Janis Beckedorf, Dirk Hartung, Michael Bommarito, and Daniel Martin Katz, *Measuring Law Over Time: A Network Analytical Framework with an Application to Statutes and Regulations in the United States and Germany*, 9 FRONTIERS PHYSICS 1 (2021) (presenting a comprehensive framework for analyzing legal documents as multi-dimensional, dynamic document networks).

6. Daniel Martin Katz, Michael J. Bommarito, Shang Gao, & Pablo Arredondo, *GPT-4 Passes the Bar Exam* (Mar. 15, 2023) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4389233 [<https://perma.cc/VF3C-UU3H>].

7. See Jonathan H. Choi, Kristin E. Hickman, Amy B. Monahan, & Daniel Schwarcz, *ChatGPT Goes to Law School*, 72 J. LEG. ED. 387 (2022).

8. See *id.*; see, e.g., Jenna Greene, *Will ChatGPT Make Lawyers Obsolete? (Hint: Be Afraid)*, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/will-chatgpt-make-lawyers-obsolete-hint-be-afraid-2022-12-09> [<https://perma.cc/85DR-ARY8>] (describing recent advances in artificial intelligence that make it more useful in the legal field, though unable to replace lawyers).

9. See, e.g., Hussam Alkaissi & Samy I. McFarlane, *Artificial Hallucinations in ChatGPT: Implications in Scientific Writing*, 15 CUREUS J. MED. SCI. 1,

importantly, LLMs typically do not have access to the nuanced facts implicated in real-world legal problems.¹⁰ Nor do AI models that are broadly available like GPT-4 reliably have the dual capacity to identify and access the latest versions of the legal source materials that shape the proper interpretation of these facts, such as governing caselaw, statutory text, or administrative codes.¹¹

Nonetheless, the remarkable capacity of LLMs to quickly and cheaply produce high-quality legal analysis with limited human intervention means that human lawyers can likely use this technology to substantially enhance the efficiency and quality of their efforts.¹² Lawyers and legal educators who refuse to recognize the possibility will, we therefore predict, ultimately be replaced by those who do.¹³

As of yet, however, there is limited publicly-available guidance about how lawyers can use widely-available LLMs like GPT-4 and Bing Chat efficiently and ethically in the context of typical legal research and writing tasks.¹⁴ This Article offers a

3 (Feb. 19, 2023), <https://assets.cureus.com/uploads/editorial/pdf/138667/20230219-28928-6keyip.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/95KN-EUU9>] (describing instances where ChatGPT generated a mix of true and completely fabricated scientific essays).

10. Choi et al., *supra* note 7.

11. Notably, tools like CoCounsel seek to provide precisely this functionality by linking an LLM model like GPT-4 to a search engine that allows it to access caselaw and other legal source material.

12. Choi et al., *supra* note 7.

13. See Jason Pohl, *From Tort Law to Cheating, What Is ChatGPT's Future in Higher Education?*, BERKELEY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2023), <https://news.berkeley.edu/2023/03/21/from-tort-law-to-cheating-what-is-chatgpts-future-in-higher-education> [<https://perma.cc/V4QS-56X2>] (noting that several Berkeley Law professors are encouraging their students to use AI tools because that is where the future of lawyering will be).

14. But see Joseph Regalia, *ChatGPT and Legal Writing: The Perfect Union?* (Feb. 26, 2023) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4371460 [<https://perma.cc/4VPK-89JG>]. We choose to focus our analysis on these two LLMs, with a particular focus on GPT-4. GPT-4 is an unambiguous improvement over prior GPT models like ChatGPT Version 3.5 in terms of the sophistication of its analysis, and it thus better reflects the future capacities of LLMs as compared to ChatGPT. See Ruby Chen, *GPT-4*, OPENAI (Mar. 14, 2023), <https://openai.com/research/gpt-4> [<https://perma.cc/GYD5-R3U4>] (Although “in a casual conversation, the distinction between GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can be subtle,” the “difference comes out when the complexity of the task reaches a sufficient threshold—GPT-4 is more reliable, creative, and able to handle much more nuanced instructions than GPT-3.5.”).

first effort to provide such guidance.¹⁵ We of course recognize that sensible techniques for deploying LLMs will vary depending on innumerable factors, including legal context and the specific LLMs that are available. Nonetheless, this article endeavors to develop generalizable strategies for using LLMs to analyze caselaw and draft legal analyses of real-world legal problems based on that caselaw. In doing so, we focus on the GPT-4 LLM, which is the most advanced model that is broadly available at the time of this writing.

Ultimately, the Article highlights how lawyers seeking to use LLMs to improve the efficiency and quality of their work must repurpose traditional legal skills to prompt and confirm the output of LLMs. Starting with prompting, the Article illustrates how lawyers can and should prompt LLMs by engaging them in dialogue.¹⁶ By systematically asking LLMs follow-up questions that break down the AI's legal analysis into constituent parts and refine its articulation of legal principles to fit the needs of the questioner, lawyers can quickly produce high-quality legal writing. Moving from prompting to confirming, the Article shows how lawyers can use AIs in ways that allow for verification of claims based directly on the relevant source material. More specifically, by requiring AIs to cite and quote from specific source material that the lawyer directly provides to the AI, lawyers can verify an AI's claims in much the same way that they would cite-check human work product.¹⁷

15. Recent papers have started to emerge offering guidance for how GPT models can be used to teach other fields, like economics. See Tyler Cowen & Alexander T. Tabarrok, *How to Learn and Teach Economics with Large Language Models, Including GPT* (GMU Working Paper in Economics, Paper No. 23-18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4391863 [<https://perma.cc/N7ZY-VL89>]. A number of recent papers systematically explore how GPT models can be used by programmers. See, e.g., Nigar M. Shafiq Surameery & Mohammed Y. Shakor, *Use Chat GPT to Solve Programming Bugs*, 3 INT'L J. INFO. TECH. & COMPUT. ENG'G 17 (2023) (exploring the use of ChatGPT in solving programming bugs).

16. See generally J.T. Dillion, *Paper Chase and the Socratic Method of Teaching Law*, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 529, 529 (1980) (analyzing Professor Kingsfield's attempt to engage his students in dialogue); Orin S. Kerr, *The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard*, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113 (1999) (exploring changes in legal pedagogy through an examination of the teaching styles, attitudes, and classroom influences of the faculty at one leading law school).

17. See generally Jonathan Mermin, *Remaking Law Review*, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 603, 604 (2004) (describing the role and responsibility of law review editors in publishing legal scholarship).

The remainder of the Article is structured as follows: Part I begins by providing general advice for using LLMs, which we then apply to specific legal problems in the following Parts. Part II describes and illustrates techniques for using LLMs to identify and understand legal source material, with an emphasis on caselaw. Part III transitions from analysis of caselaw to legal writing, describing specific techniques that lawyers can use to produce initial drafts of legal texts with the assistance of AIs like GPT-4. It also considers the ethical elements of this practice, suggesting that in most legal settings it is indeed appropriate for lawyers to use AI-generated text in legal filings and similar legal documents. Finally, Part IV explores various potential extensions, such as using LLMs to draft contracts and to edit first-drafts of legal writing.

I. GENERAL PROMPT-ENGINEERING STRATEGIES

The quickest route to proficiency with LLMs is the same route to Carnegie Hall: practice, practice, practice. In addition to the specific strategies described above, lawyers can learn about GPT-4's and Bing Chat's strengths and limitations through experimentation. The authors have used GPT-4 to write first drafts of administrative documents; to suggest dinner recipes; to find fun vacation activities; to write computer code; and more. In experimenting with the capabilities of AI language models in any domain, what follows are some general tips to keep in mind.¹⁸

A. PROVIDE DETAILS

Perhaps the most common mistake made by new users of LLMs is to provide insufficient detail. Search engines have conditioned us to provide narrowly targeted search queries, and

18. We do not claim credit for inventing these general prompt engineering tips, which have been covered extensively elsewhere. *E.g.*, Dils, *How to Use ChatGPT: Advanced Prompt Engineering*, WGMI MEDIA (July 20, 2023), <https://wgmiimedia.com/how-to-use-chatgpt-advanced-prompt-engineering> [<https://perma.cc/3ZER-KRCW>] (providing general tips for improving ChatGPT outputs); Cowen & Tabarrok *supra* note 15. Users seeking inspiration for the kinds of things LLMs can do can find lists of interesting prompts online—for example, *Awesome ChatGPT Prompts*, GITHUB, <https://github.com/f/awesome-chatgpt-prompts#readme> [<https://perma.cc/UD94-CB6B>]. Prompt engineering has gained in importance as a way for companies to adapt LLMs to specific purposes without costly fine-tuning. *E.g.*, Alan D. Thompson, *Microsoft Bing Chat (Sydney/GPT-4)*, LIFE ARCHITECT (Feb. 22, 2023), https://life architect.ai/bing-chat/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email [<https://perma.cc/Y5ZN-DM8C>] (quoting the prompts used to convert GPT's base model into Bing Chat).

many people's first instinct is to translate these narrow queries into LLM prompts. Fight that instinct! LLMs can accommodate extraordinary levels of details, and the more elaborate the prompt, the more you specify your goals, your expected output, the tone of the output, and the considerations the LLM should keep in mind, the better the results.

For example, LLMs can exhibit surprising improvement when asked to respond in the voice of a specific expert. Section II.A below gives an example where GPT-4 hallucinates an incorrect answer to a question about a case; however, it gives the correct answer when the prompt asks about the case "as Harvard Law School professor Cass Sunstein might analyze it."¹⁹ (Different famous lawyers produce different results; try experimenting with a mix of practicing lawyers, judges, and academics.) Additional detail and specific examples of the kind of output that would be most helpful will generally produce better results. For example, instead of asking GPT-4 simply to proofread a document, ask it to "apply principles from Strunk and White's 'Elements of Style'"²⁰ to proofread a document.

Another well-documented technique to improve LLM performance is "few-shot" prompting, where users provide examples of good responses to LLMs.²¹ Rather than simply asking the LLM for the answer to a question, try providing it with an analogous question and the correct answer to that question. This will prime the LLM to answer in the specific format you desire and to engage in the kind of reasoning that you are looking for. Few-shot prompting is especially useful when using LLMs for advice on niche topics.

B. ITERATE

A second revolutionary feature of LLMs is the ability to hold sustained conversations. Again, conditioned by decades of search engine use, many people initially try to craft a single perfect prompt to elicit the response they want from the LLM. This is unnecessary; it's possible, and indeed desirable, to steer the LLM

19. Cowen & Tabarrok, *supra* note 15, at 9.

20. *Hard Fork: Bard Fork, And How to Talk So Chatbots Will Listen*, NY TIMES (Mar. 24, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/24/podcasts/hard-fork-bard.html> [<https://perma.cc/4A8D-ZFFU>] (suggesting the Strunk and White prompt).

21. The method is called "few-shot" as opposed to the default of "zero-shot" prompting, when zero examples are provided to the LLM.

by providing follow-ups to its initial response. If its answer is inadequate or not quite what you wanted, tell it that it failed and why. If the response was good but more detail would be helpful, indicate that as well.

Many of the specific examples that follow apply the concept of iteration. After establishing general legal context for an LLM using an initial query, lawyers can probe relevant aspects of particular cases and use the LLM to produce specific desired results. Most classic legal research tools, like Westlaw or even Google, act as oracles that produce a single result. LLMs like GPT-4 and Bing Chat are more like ordinary conversational partners and should be treated as such for best results.

C. THINK STEP BY STEP

As suggested above, LLM responses are heavily dependent on specific content of the prompt. One of the most important recent discoveries about LLMs has been that users can significantly improve the quality of responses *merely by asking it to reason step by step*. This method, known as “chain-of-thought prompting,” has been widely adopted among LLM users, including the designers of GPT-4.²²

To use chain-of-thought prompting, simply add the phrase “think step by step”²³ to a prompt. Doing so has two benefits. First, it will elicit reasoning that the user can then check for quality—and if the reasoning is deficient, the user can subsequently correct it through the iterative process described above. Second, simply asking the LLM to think step by step can sometimes improve the quality of the response.²⁴ Findings on this second point are mixed, however, potentially because more recent LLMs like GPT-4 are rumored to have been trained to conduct chain-of-thought reasoning without explicit prompting.

22. Chen, *supra* note 14 (suggesting that GPT-4’s performance can be augmented by chain-of-thought prompting).

23. Takeshi Kojima, Shixiang Shane Gu, Machel Reid, Yutaka Matsuo, & Yusuke Iwasawa, Large Language Models are Zero-Shot Reasoners (Jan. 11, 2023) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.11916.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/UXA3-DGD2>].

24. *Id.*

II. USING AIS TO ANALYZE POTENTIALLY RELEVANT CASES

Perhaps the most basic skill that most lawyers must possess in any common law system is to read and understand judicial opinions. It is for precisely this reason that much of the first year of law school is devoted to this task.²⁵ LLMs offer the potential to fundamentally alter the processes by which lawyers identify and understand caselaw. Part A, below, considers the former point, exploring how lawyers and law students can use LLMs to identify relevant cases relating to a specific legal problem. Part B then discusses strategies for using LLMs to efficiently and effectively understand caselaw. Although this Part focuses on caselaw, much of the analysis is equally applicable to other legal source material, such as statutes, regulations, or regulatory bulletins.

A. USING AI TO IDENTIFY RELEVANT RULES AND SOURCE MATERIAL

At present, AI tools like GPT-4 and Bing Chat have a significant capacity to help lawyers identify relevant legal rules governing specific legal issues. In many cases, Bing Chat is superior to GPT-4 for this purpose because it will provide specific citations to its source material and is not limited by a historical corpus of text, like GPT-4. However, GPT-4 can also be extremely useful for this purpose, particularly when it comes to prominent legal issues with clear source material.

GPT-4 excels at explaining legal rules governing well-known issues of federal law that feature prominently in the corpus of text on which it was trained. To illustrate, suppose a lawyer's client is sued for defamation in connection with reporting they performed for a prominent newspaper, and they are looking to brush up on the basic rules governing this area. A good first step would be to *ask GPT-4 about the rules governing this issue*, as illustrated below.

*When can a reporter be held liable for defamation?*²⁶

25. See Orin S. Kerr, *How to Read a Legal Opinion: A Guide for New Law Students*, 11 GREEN BAG 51 (2007) (explaining the most important parts of a legal opinion in a digestible format for new law students).

26. GPT-4's response: "*I am not a lawyer, but I can provide you with some general information on this topic. A reporter can be held liable for defamation if they publish or broadcast false information that causes harm to someone's*

Of course, while answers from GPT-4 such as those provided here (most such answers are provided in the footnotes), appear accurate, they cannot be trusted at face value. AIs have a well-known tendency to provide incorrect answers or even to hallucinate source material.²⁷ For this reason, it is essential that the lawyer employing this technique ask GPT-4 to identify the relevant source material on which their answer is based.

*What legal source material do these rules come from?*²⁸

reputation. There are some key elements to consider when determining if a reporter can be held liable for defamation: 1. False statement: The reporter must have made a false statement of fact, not just an opinion or commentary. A true statement, even if harmful to someone's reputation, is generally not considered defamatory. 2. Identification: The defamatory statement must identify the person being defamed, either directly or indirectly. This could include using the person's name, image, or providing enough information that they can be identified by others. 3. Publication: The statement must be published or broadcast, meaning it has been communicated to a third party. This could be in a newspaper, online article, TV broadcast, or even social media. 4. Fault: The reporter must be at fault for publishing the false statement. In the case of private individuals, the standard is usually negligence, meaning the reporter failed to exercise reasonable care in verifying the information. For public officials or public figures, the standard is typically 'actual malice,' which means the reporter either knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 5. Damages: The person claiming defamation must prove that they suffered harm as a result of the false statement. This could include damage to their reputation, financial loss, or emotional distress. Laws regarding defamation can vary by jurisdiction, and there may be additional nuances and exceptions to consider. Anyone who believes they have been defamed should consult with a qualified attorney to understand their rights and potential remedies."

27. See Alkaissi & McFarlane, *supra* note 9.

28. GPT-4's answer: "These rules for defamation liability stem from a combination of common law principles and statutory law, which can vary depending on the jurisdiction. In the United States, the key legal sources for defamation law include: (1) Common law: Defamation has its roots in English common law, which is a body of law developed through court decisions over time. Many U.S. states have adopted and adapted these common law principles in their own legal systems, and state courts continue to refine and develop defamation law through their decisions. (2) State statutes: Some states have enacted statutory laws regarding defamation, which may define elements of defamation, set forth defenses or exceptions, or specify remedies and damages. These statutes can vary from state to state, and may modify or supplement common law principles. (3) U.S. Constitution: The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and the press, which places limits on defamation law. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* (1964) established the 'actual malice' standard for public officials, which was later extended to public figures in *Curtis Publishing*

Having, in this case, identified one particular case as a key source for the underlying rules (*New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*), GPT-4 is also very well suited to explain the case precisely because it is a prominent Supreme Court case.

*Summarize the holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.*²⁹

By contrast, *GPT-4 cannot be relied upon to explain more specific legal source material*, especially questions on specific cases that may not have been included in the corpus on which it was trained. For example:

*Which opinion in U.S. v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (1990) reflected a pragmatic interpretive perspective and why?*³⁰

Co. v. Butts (1967). This higher standard of fault is intended to balance the need to protect individual reputations with the importance of free and open debate on matters of public concern. (4) Federal laws: While defamation law is primarily governed by state law, there are some federal laws that can impact defamation cases, such as the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). Section 230 of the CDA provides immunity to internet service providers and platforms from liability for defamatory content posted by third parties. It's important to note that defamation laws may differ in other countries, as they may have their own legal systems, constitutional protections, and statutes governing defamation."

29. GPT-4's answer: "*New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established important constitutional protections for freedom of speech and the press in defamation cases involving public officials. In this case, the Court held that a public official cannot recover damages for a defamatory statement relating to their official conduct unless they can prove the statement was made with 'actual malice.' The Court defined 'actual malice' as knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. The Court reasoned that such a high standard of fault was necessary to protect the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press, as well as to encourage robust and uninhibited debate on matters of public concern. By requiring public officials to prove actual malice, the Court sought to prevent defamation lawsuits from being used to silence or punish critics of government actions. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan significantly strengthened First Amendment protections in defamation cases and has had a lasting impact on U.S. defamation law. The 'actual malice' standard has since been extended to cases involving public figures, as well as public officials."*

30. GPT-4's answer: "*In U.S. v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (1990), also known as the 'LSD blotter paper' case, the majority opinion written by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook reflected a pragmatic interpretive perspective In contrast, the dissenting opinion by Judge Richard A. Posner took a more purposive approach, focusing on the purpose of the sentencing guidelines to punish based on the harm caused by the drug, not the weight of the carrier medium."*

Although GPT-4 indicates in its answer that Judge Easterbrook's opinion reflected a pragmatic perspective, the correct answer is that Judge Posner's opinion in the case was pragmatist.

Although the potential for this type of error in GPT-4's analysis is directly related to the specificity of the question asked, there is no way to know whether its answers are correct without performing independent legal research. This fact points to a significant advantage of Bing Chat over current versions of GPT-4 when it comes to scoping out an initial legal issue: Unlike GPT-4, Bing Chat³¹ provides specific citations to its source material and is not limited by a historical corpus of text, like GPT-4. Perhaps for related reasons, Bing Chat not only provided an accurate answer to the question regarding *United States v. Marshall* (at least on some attempts), but also cited its source material.³² In particular, Bing's answer links to a 1991 U.S. Supreme Court case, *Chapman v. United States*.³³ A quick search for "Posner" in the opinion reveals several quotations from the opinion that confirm his pragmatist approach in *United States v. Marshall*. For example, Judge Posner's dissenting opinion in *United States v. Marshall* noted that "the severity of the sentences in LSD cases would be comparable to those in other drug cases only if the weight of the LSD carrier were disregarded."³⁴

B. USING AI TO ANALYZE RELEVANT CASELAW

AIs like GPT-4 can be very useful tools not only for identifying potentially relevant caselaw, but also for understanding it. Although there is no single correct approach to using GPT-4 for this purpose, one specific approach that can produce helpful results is detailed below. While these steps provide a good starting point for learning how to use GPT-4 to develop one's own practices and preferences, they are just that—a starting point.

31. This and all subsequent Bing Chat conversations were conducted using the "Precise" setting.

32. Bing Chat's response: "*Judge Posner's dissenting opinion in U.S. v. Marshall reflected a pragmatic interpretive perspective. He noted that the severity of sentences in LSD cases would be comparable to those in other drug cases only if the weight of the LSD carrier were disregarded.*"

33. *Chapman v. United States*, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). Bing Chat found this case at <https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/90-5744.ZD.html> [<https://perma.cc/4A7X-YUZU>].

34. *Chapman*, 500 U.S. at 469.

1. Using AI to Produce Case Summaries

AI's can often produce quick summaries of well-known cases simply through a direct query, as demonstrated by the example above involving *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*. In most cases, however, the best route to generating accurate case summaries is to *copy and paste the entire text of a potentially relevant opinion into GPT-4 and ask it to state the holding of the case*. At present, this approach is only feasible in GPT models like GPT-4 rather than Bing, as the latter has a query limit of only 2000 characters, which even the shortest legal opinions typically exceed.

To illustrate this approach, we asked GPT-4 to state the holding of one case, *Chipokas v. Hugg*,³⁵ by using the following prompt:

*Identify the holding in the following case, which is quoted in full here: “[copy and paste text of Chipokas opinion, with no headnotes or other summary. Put the case in quotation marks so that GPT-4 can extract quotations from text in answering later questions].”*³⁶

Notably, this synopsis of the case is substantially more readable and accurate than either the court-supplied synopsis³⁷ or the West headnotes to the case.³⁸

35. 477 N.W.2d 688 (1991).

36. GPT-4's answer: “*The holding in this case is that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Huggs, because (1) the ‘Proposal to Lease’ was not a contract giving the parties enforceable rights, and (2) the plaintiff, Mr. Chipokas, could not recover on the theory of promissory estoppel as there was no clear and definite agreement between the parties.*”

37. Here is the court-supplied synopsis: “Owner of commercial property sued for breach of oral lease, breach of written agreement to lease, and on theory of promissory estoppel. The District Court, Linn County, L. Vern Robinson, J., granted summary judgment for prospective tenants asserting that no enforceable contract was ever reached. Owner of premises appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hayden, J., held that: (1) proposal to lease was not final binding lease agreement enforceable by parties, but merely preliminary negotiations, and (2) owner was not induced to act by proposal to lease or surrounding circumstances so as to permit owner to recover against prospective tenants on basis of promissory estoppel.” *Chipokas*, 477 N.W.2d at 688.

38. Here is the text of the two headnotes: (1) “Proposal to lease was not final binding contract giving owner of premises enforceable rights in commercial lease, but was merely preliminary negotiations, where at least three contract terms were not resolved and agreed upon.” (2) “Owner of premises was not

In cases where the summary produced by GPT-4 piques a lawyer's interest, lawyers may frequently find it helpful to *instruct the AI to generate a slightly lengthier summary that goes into a bit more detail in the case.*

*Provide a slightly more detailed summary of the case.*³⁹

At present, one meaningful complication to this first simple step is that many cases are too long to be entered into the query box of GPT-4; the “context length”—or length of the prompt plus the maximum number of words in the completion—is currently approximately 8,000 for the GPT-4 model currently accessible through ChatGPT Plus.⁴⁰ While this limit will likely increase in the long term (GPT-4's full token limit available to some API users is approximately 32,000 words, longer than many novels and more than 50 full-length pages), there are workarounds that can be used to process longer cases in the meantime. One simple, though sometimes cumbersome (depending on the length of the

induced to act by proposal for commercial lease agreement or surrounding circumstances so as to permit owner to recover on theory of promissory estoppel as against prospective tenant, where language of proposal to lease was decidedly conditional, not definite, and some details were left for future negotiation.”

39. GPT-4's answer: “*In this case, Mr. Chipokas, a commercial property owner, sued the Huggs for breach of an oral lease, breach of a written agreement to lease, and on the theory of promissory estoppel. The parties had signed a ‘Proposal to Lease,’ which explicitly stated it was ‘conditional upon a final lease acceptable to both Lessee and Lessor and the plans and specifications also acceptable to both parties.’ However, the parties couldn’t agree on certain terms, and the forty-paragraph lease agreement was never signed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants (the Huggs) because the ‘Proposal to Lease’ was not a contract giving the parties enforceable rights, and promissory estoppel did not apply as there was no clear and definite agreement between the parties. Mr. Chipokas appealed the decision. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision. It agreed that the ‘Proposal to Lease’ was not a contract but merely a proposal, and therefore, it did not give the parties enforceable rights. The court also rejected Mr. Chipokas’s claim that the proposal to lease was enforceable as a mutually binding obligation to negotiate in good faith, as this issue had not been raised at the district court level. Additionally, the court found that Mr. Chipokas could not recover on the theory of promissory estoppel because there was no clear and definite agreement between the parties. The ‘Proposal to Lease’ was conditional and left some details for future negotiation. Given these undisputed facts, the court concluded that it was unreasonable to find Mr. Chipokas was induced to act by the proposal to lease or surrounding circumstances.*”

40. See Joshua J., *What is the Difference Between the GPT-4 Models?*, OPENAI (no date), <https://help.openai.com/en/articles/7127966-what-is-the-difference-between-the-gpt-4-models> [<https://perma.cc/JFA3-9DAZ>].

case), solution is to *ask the AI to summarize each of the constituent parts of an opinion in a series of questions contained within a single chat*. When employing this approach, it's important to use natural section breaks in the opinion so that no meaning is lost across queries. Moreover, it's a good practice to *specifically tell GPT-4 that you are asking it to summarize multiple parts of a case; after summarizing the individual portions of the case, GPT-4 can then be asked to summarize the entire case*. The following queries work well to accomplish these goals:

(1) Summarize Part I of the following case, [Case Name], which is contained here: “[copy and paste text of first ~2000 words of opinion only, with no headnotes or other summary. Put the case in quotation marks so that GPT-4 can extract quotations from text in answering later questions].”

(2) Summarize Part II of [Case Name], which is contained here: “[copy and paste text of second portion of opinion, constituting no more than ~2000 words].”

(3) Now summarize all of [Case Name] based on both Part I and Part II.

2. Using AI to Probe Relevance of Cases

In some cases, one or even multiple case summaries produced by GPT-4 will make clear the importance or relevance of a case to a desired legal task. In these instances, the next step will almost always be to read or skim the opinion directly to get a basic sense of its structure and analysis, and then to move to Step 3.

But in some cases, a summary produced by an AI may not clarify whether a case is likely to be helpful in completing an underlying legal task. In these cases, a user can effectively *use GPT-4 to probe relevance quickly by engaging it in dialogue*.

To illustrate, suppose a young lawyer has been tasked with writing a memo on the application of promissory estoppel in the context of preliminary assurances by one party that induced reliance by the other party. Such a lawyer might review the summary of *Chipokas* produced by GPT-4 and be uncertain about the extent to which *Chipokas* focused on promissory estoppel. GPT-4 is a perfect tool to get a quick answer to this type of question without having to review the case directly. To accomplish this, it will often be easiest and most accurate to *ask GPT-4 to elaborate on the specific portion within its summary that is of potential*

interest. And in many cases, the easiest way to do this is to copy and paste the portion of the AI's answer that is of greatest potential interest and ask the AI to expand on that analysis.

Summarize the court's promissory estoppel analysis and explain why the court found that there was no clear and definite agreement that the plaintiff could rely upon to his detriment.⁴¹

In sum, GPT-4 and similar AIs can be an extremely useful tool for quickly establishing how relevant caselaw may be to a particular legal topic and for developing a solid understanding of the basic parameters of the case.

3. Using AI to Develop a Deep Understanding of Caselaw

Once a lawyer concludes that a case is indeed relevant to a specific legal task, the next step is generally for them to read, or at least skim, the case, using AI-produced summaries like those produced above as a guide. By contrast, relying solely on the AI to explain a relevant case without at least quickly reviewing the text of the opinion directly is a dangerous practice. Even the very best current models are known to “hallucinate” incorrect facts or law, as mentioned above, making it imprudent to rely on them without double-checking.⁴²

There is no single formula for how to use LLM models like GPT-4 to better understand and evaluate cases: GPT-4 can answer virtually any question that the user may have about the case. One good starting point, however, is to *structure questions*

41. GPT-4's answer: “*The court's promissory estoppel analysis focused on determining whether there was a clear and definite agreement between the parties, which is one of the required elements for promissory estoppel to apply. The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a clear and definite agreement, (2) proof the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied upon it to their detriment, and (3) a finding that equity supports enforcement of the agreement. In this case, the court found that the 'Proposal to Lease' was not a clear and definite agreement, as it was conditional and some details were left for future negotiation. The language of the proposal stated it was 'conditional upon a final lease acceptable to both Lessee and Lessor and plans and specifications also acceptable to both parties.'* The court reasoned that, given these undisputed facts, it was unreasonable to find that Chipokas was induced to act by the proposal to lease or surrounding circumstances. Although Chipokas may have sought a written commitment to lease the property, he did not get one. As a result, the court concluded that the first element of promissory estoppel, a clear and definite agreement, was not satisfied. Therefore, promissory estoppel did not apply, and the court affirmed the district court's decision.”

42. Alkaissi & McFarlane, *supra* note 9, at 3.

to GPT-4 regarding a case to parallel the basic structure of a 1L case brief: by asking the AI to identify the relevant issues, rules, and application of those rules to the facts.

In doing so, a best practice is to ask GPT-4 to *quote the relevant language from the opinion it relies upon in its answer to any question*. In doing so, the user is essentially asking GPT-4 to provide citations with pincites for its answers to any questions so that those answers can be substantiated by the user, much as a cite checker might do for any legal opinion.

a. Identifying and Expanding on Relevant Rules Used by Court

One natural first step in using an LLM to develop a deeper understanding of a case is to *ask it to identify the rule or rules that the case uses*. As applied to *Chipokas*, for instance, a user might ask what rule the court uses to determine when assurances by one party can form the basis of a promissory estoppel claim by another party. The user can ask the AI directly for this rule and ask the AI to substantiate its rule by quoting directly from the case:

*What rule does the court use to determine whether the proposal to lease was enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Quote directly from the case excerpted above in your answer.*⁴³

In many instances, users can iteratively ask more questions to elicit further details about the key rules that a court deployed in an opinion. Here, for instance, the AI indicated that one key question for purposes of the *Chipokas* case's promissory estoppel analysis was whether a clear and definite agreement existed. The user might therefore ask what specific guidance the court gives on identifying a clear and definite agreement:

43. GPT-4's answer: "*The court used the elements of promissory estoppel to determine whether the proposal to lease was enforceable under the doctrine. The court quoted the elements of promissory estoppel from a previous case, Citizens First National Bank of Storm Lake v. Turin: 'The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a clear and definite agreement, (2) proof the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied upon it to his detriment, and (3) a finding that equity supports enforcement of the agreement.'*"

What specific guidance does the court give regarding when a clear and definite agreement exists? Quote directly from the case excerpted above in your answer.⁴⁴

b. Understanding How the Court Applied the Rule to the Facts

After having used GPT-4 to better understand the relevant legal rules at play in a case, a lawyer can continue to use the AI to understand how the court applied those rules to the facts. Once again, a good strategy for accomplishing this is to *use, in follow-up questions, snippets from the language that GPT-4 provided in prior answers so that the relationship among different questions is clear.*

Why does the court conclude that there was no clear and definite agreement reached by the parties, and therefore, the plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element of promissory estoppel? Quote directly from the case excerpted above in your answer.⁴⁵

Further questioning can dig still more deeply into this analysis. For instance, while GPT-4 made clear in its first answer that it was important to the *Chipokas* court that “some details in the proposal were left for future negotiation,” it did not specify what those details were. This may simply reflect the court’s own lack of specificity on point, or it may reflect GPT-4’s effort to

44. GPT-4’s answer: “The court gives guidance on what constitutes a clear and definite agreement under promissory estoppel. As stated in the excerpt: ‘A clear understanding by the promisor that the promisee was seeking an assurance upon which he could rely and without which he would not act.’ The court also cites the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, which defines an agreement for purposes of promissory estoppel as ‘[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action . . . on the part of the promisee.’”

45. Once again, GPT-4’s answer is superb—it clearly and accurately identifies the precise facts that the court highlighted in its analysis applying the rule. GPT-4’s answer: “The court concludes that there was no clear and definite agreement reached by the parties based on the language of the proposal to lease and the surrounding circumstances. The court states: ‘Whether we focus solely on the words of the proposal or consider its meaning in the surrounding circumstances, we are unable to find a clear and definite agreement the Huggs would reasonably understand to induce action. The language of the proposal to lease was decidedly conditional, not definite. The “entire proposal [was] conditional upon a final lease acceptable to both Lessee and Lessor and plans and specifications also acceptable to both parties.” Some details in the proposal were left for future negotiation.’ Therefore, the court concludes that the first element of promissory estoppel is not satisfied because there was no clear and definite agreement reached by the parties.”

summarize facts that could well be important to the user in assessing their own hypothetical scenario. A simple follow-up question can clarify:

*What specific details in the proposal were left for future negotiation such that they indicated that the proposal was not a final agreement, but rather a preliminary negotiation. Quote directly from the case excerpted above in your answer.*⁴⁶

Here, a warning is in order: forcing GPT-4 to quote directly from the case allows the user to cite check the AI's answers to ensure that they are accurate. But, *in some cases GPT-4 may indicate that there is no relevant text; unfortunately, there is no way to confidently know whether that answer is accurate, and in some cases it may not be.* To illustrate, in some iterations of the above line of questioning, ChatGPT produced a very different, and seemingly contradictory, answer to the question of what specific details were left for negotiation, such as the following: *"The court does not specify what details were left for further negotiation."* Thus, users must be extremely wary of answers that cannot be substantiated by GPT-4 with specific excerpts from the text, including such claims that there is no relevant text within the opinion.

So far, GPT-4 has identified and explained two types of arguments that the court uses to conclude there was no clear and definite promise: (i) the explicit language of the proposal to lease, and (ii) the fact that some details of the lease agreement were left for further discussion. Any good questioner will want to know whether there were any other factors that were relevant to the court in concluding that there was no clear and definite agreement in the case. In doing so, it is again advisable to *use the same exact phrases that have been used in prior questions with the AI, and even to make clear to the AI how your question is meant to relate to prior parts of the discussion:*

46. GPT-4's answer: *"The specific elements of the lease that were not resolved between the parties were whether the lease should contain an indemnity provision, a provision requiring the tenant to pay for building repairs, and a provision giving the landlord a lien over the tenants' property on the premises. As stated in the excerpt: 'Most items were acceptable to all parties; however, three were not. The unacceptable items included whether the lease should contain an indemnity provision, a provision requiring the tenant to pay for building repairs, and a provision giving the landlord a lien over the tenants' property on the premises.'"*

Was the court's conclusion that there was no clear and definite promise influenced by any factors other than the two you've already highlighted: (i) the explicit language of the proposal to lease, and (ii) the fact that the final lease agreement was not signed in part because of three specific areas of disagreement governing indemnity, repairs, and a lien? Quote directly from the case excerpted above in your answer.⁴⁷

Rather than concluding the questioning here, the skilled questioner may review past questions to ensure that no potentially relevant issues or questions have been missed or to elaborate on any elements that were not fully explored. Reviewing GPT-4's answers so far, one notable question is whether the court's analysis in *Chipokas* focused exclusively on the first element of the promissory estoppel test (i.e., the existence of a clear and definite promise), or also noted the second element as well (i.e., reasonable reliance).

Did the court's analysis rely solely on the first element of promissory estoppel (a clear and definite agreement), or did it also analyze the second element of promissory estoppel (proof the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied upon it to his detriment)? Quote directly from the case excerpted above in your answer.⁴⁸

47. Once again, GPT-4's answer is illuminating: "Yes, the court's conclusion that there was no clear and definite promise was influenced by additional factors beyond the explicit language of the proposal to lease and the three specific areas of disagreement. The court also considered the nature of the agreement, which is a commercial lease of real estate, typically found in writing with many details. The court explained that the subject matter needed a formal writing for its full expression, and the final details were not agreed upon, as evidenced by the unresolved issues and the conditional nature of the proposal to lease. Additionally, the court noted that the forty-paragraph lease agreement was prepared by Mr. Chipokas after the proposal to lease, which indicated that the parties intended to negotiate a formal written lease. Considering these factors, the court agreed with the district court's determination that the document was a proposal and not a contract giving the parties enforceable rights."

48. GPT-4's answer: "The court's analysis primarily focused on the first element of promissory estoppel (a clear and definite agreement). However, it did briefly touch upon the second element (proof the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied upon it to his detriment). Here's a direct quote from the case: 'Whether we focus solely on the words of the proposal or consider its meaning in the surrounding circumstances, we are unable to find a clear and definite agreement the Huggs would reasonably understand to induce action. The language of the proposal to lease was decidedly conditional, not definite. The "entire proposal [was] conditional upon a final lease acceptable to both Lessee and Lessor and plans and specifications also acceptable to both parties." Some details in the proposal were left for future negotiation.' 'Given these undisputed

Having used GPT-4 to gain a deep appreciation for the *Chipokas* case, the questioner is likely to want to know what caselaw figured prominently in the court's analysis.

*What were the most important precedents that the court relied on in its promissory estoppel analysis? Quote directly from the case excerpted above in your answer.*⁴⁹

III. USING AI TO PRODUCE FIRST DRAFTS OF MEMOS AND BRIEFS

So far, the discussion has focused on using AIs to research and understand caselaw and other types of legal source material. But the power of LLMs goes much further than simply allowing lawyers to reliably understand such legal source material: AIs are capable of efficiently and persuasively applying this legal source material to specific real world legal problems. This Part therefore turns from tasks associated with researching and understanding legal source material to the more fundamental lawyerly task of applying legal rules to real-world problems. Before fully exploring this functionality of LLMs, however, Part A pauses to consider the ethical questions surrounding using AI in this fashion. Having laid out the ethical case for lawyers to make free use of LLM's work product in most types of legal materials, Part B transitions from the question of "whether" to "how," laying out various specific strategies for lawyers to make effective use of GPT-4 to produce legal memos and briefs.

A. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The use of LLMs described in Part I involves few ethical quandaries, as none of the output produced by the AI in

facts, it is unreasonable to find Mr. Chipokas was induced to act by the proposal to lease or surrounding circumstances. Mr. Chipokas may have sought a written commitment to lease the property, but he did not get one. Therefore, we affirm the district court on this issue."

49. GPT-4's answer: "The court relied on several precedents in its promissory estoppel analysis, including the cases of *In re Estate of Graham*, 295 N.W.2d 414, 418–19 (Iowa 1980), *Johnson v. Pattison*, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795–97 (Iowa 1971), and *Miller v. Lawlor*, 245 Iowa 1144, 1151–57, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272–75 (1954). As stated in the excerpt: 'The court in *Moeller* determined the first element was satisfied in *Miller and Pattison*. *Id.* at 889. The court found "a clear understanding by the promisor that the promisee was seeking an assurance upon which he could rely and without which he would not act." A similar finding could not be made in *Graham*."

researching and analyzing caselaw involves lawyers repurposing text produced by an LLM in work product that a user claims is their own. But when and under what circumstances may a lawyer use text produced by GPT-4 or a similar AI to help draft legal work product? This is a much thornier ethical question.

Using modern LLM tools to produce work product that is assigned to a student in a law school setting is plainly unethical unless the instructor has specifically allowed students to make use of this type of technology. The instructor's purpose in that setting will typically be to test and develop students' own capacity to engage in legal research, writing, and analysis, rather than to see how well the student can use tools like GPT-4 to create the appearance that they have acquired these skills.⁵⁰ Using GPT-4 or similar tools to circumvent this learning and assessment process is just as unethical as any other form of cheating both because it undermines the core purposes of legal education and it allows some students who intentionally violate the rules to gain an unfair advantage over other students who comply with the rules.⁵¹

The ethical terrain becomes substantially muddier, however, with respect to the obligations of practicing lawyers. Unlike law students, the principal obligations of lawyers are to serve their clients.⁵² Although there are of course legal and ethical guardrails that constrain this objective, these guardrails generally involve risks associated with harming third parties or undermining the administration of justice.⁵³ None of these concerns are at play when it comes to practicing lawyers using text generated by GPT-4 in their own legal materials. Most notably, unlike traditional forms of plagiarism, no other person's or organization's own work is being repurposed by the user. To the

50. See Daniel Schwarcz & Dion Farganis, *The Impact of Individualized Feedback on Law Student Performance*, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139, 142 (2017) (discussing the positive impact that individualized feedback can have on a law student's legal analysis skills).

51. See Lori A. Roberts & Monica M. Todd, *Let's Be Honest about Law School Cheating: A Low-Tech Solution for a High-Tech Problem*, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2018) (exploring how law students are primed to cheat, as well as the particular consequences students face due to academic dishonesty in law school).

52. Renee Knake Jefferson, *Lawyer Ethics for Innovation*, 35 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2021); David Luban, *Fiduciary Legal Ethics, Zeal, and Moral Activism*, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 276 (2020).

53. See W. Bradley Wendel, *Should Lawyers Be Loyal to Clients, the Law, or Both?*, 65 AM. J. JURIS. 19, 20 (2020).

contrary, all of the text generated by AIs like GPT-4 and Bing Chat is distinctive and has, in general, not been copied from any particular source at all, but instead has been generated by the AI in ways that resemble how a lawyer would generate new text on their own.

It follows that lawyers should not feel ethically constrained from using text generated by GPT-4 in legal work product such as briefs, memos, and contracts that are produced outside of the educational setting when doing so is in the interest of their clients. To the contrary, a plausible argument can be made that lawyers have an ethical obligation to affirmatively use these tools if doing so can allow them to more efficiently produce legal work product (saving the client money if they pay on an hourly basis) or use these tools to produce higher quality work product (increasing the chances that their legal work product will achieve the client's aims).⁵⁴ Not only can expanded use of AI tools like GPT-4 and Bing Chat serve the interests of lawyers' existing clients, but it can also plausibly help to expand the availability of legal services to lower-income individuals who have historically lacked the resources to pay for such legal services.⁵⁵

Consistent with this analysis, lawyers have long used methods that mirror copying AI-generated text. In particular, lawyers routinely copy and paste legal text that they did not themselves produce when doing so (i) improves the efficiency/quality of their legal work product, and (ii) does not improperly appropriate text that was produced by another person or entity. The best example is the widespread practice of using preexisting contract forms as a starting point for crafting new contracts; not only is this practice tolerated, it is affirmatively taught and encouraged precisely because it is more efficient and effective than drafting each new contract from scratch, even if it does produce certain negative consequences.⁵⁶ Similarly, plaintiffs' lawyers often copy and

54. Brian L. Frye, *Should Using an AI Text Generator to Produce Academic Writing Be Plagiarism?*, 33 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 946, 958 (2023); Nicole Yamane, *Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Field and the Indispensable Human Element Legal Ethics Demands*, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 877, 882 (2020).

55. Some companies are betting on just this possibility, claiming that AI tools can allow individuals to circumvent the need to hire a lawyer entirely. See DONOTPAY, <https://donotpay.com> [<https://perma.cc/KJN3-PU39>]. See also J.J. Prescott, *Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology*, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1993, 2004 (2017).

56. See, e.g., Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, *Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu*, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 74 (2013)

paste old versions of complaints that they or someone else at their firm drafted to initiate new suits with similar facts and legal theories.⁵⁷ Even judges often copy and paste old language of their former opinions into new opinions when the context makes that language equally applicable, such as in the portion of a legal opinion laying out the standard of review on summary judgment.⁵⁸ Just as with a lawyer who uses text generated by GPT-4 in a legal document, each of these examples demonstrate the ethical appropriateness of lawyers using shortcuts that repurpose text that they did not produce when doing so does not intrude on the proprietary interests of others.⁵⁹

For practicing lawyers, the main consideration in using AI models for lawyering will be confidentiality. At present, OpenAI and Microsoft's assurances about data security and confidentiality will be insufficient for many legal settings. Because the underlying technology is not yet fully understood, it's difficult for these companies to completely prevent bugs that might reveal the content of user queries to other users.⁶⁰ Third-party companies integrating large language models, like Harvey,⁶¹ provide greater assurances of confidentiality and may ultimately be the only way for practicing lawyers to use large language models when dealing with sensitive client information.

(tracing the history of standardized contracts); Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, *If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond Contracts*, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 617, 620 (2019) (discussing the role of standard terms in sovereign bond contracts); Robert E. Scott, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, *Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and Public Company Transactions*, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 629, 629 (2020) (explaining that "the majority of the provisions in contemporary commercial contracts are boilerplate terms derived from prior transactions and even the most sophisticated contracting parties pay little attention to these standard terms, focusing instead on the price of the transaction.").

57. See Marcus Alexander Gadson, *Stolen Plausibility*, 110 GEO. L.J. 291, 327 (2022) ("Litigants will not have to expend time and resources conducting a pre-suit investigation. Instead, they can simply look for a complaint filed in another lawsuit, copy and paste the allegations, and be on their way.").

58. Tomasz Raburski & Maciej Wojciechowski, *Standardization of Judicial Opinions: Work of Judges in a Changing Environment*, ESIL ANN. RSCH F. 1, 4 (2019) (describing the "standardization of opinions" through the practice of "copying and pasting").

59. See Frye, *supra* note 54.

60. E.g., Sam Altman (@sama), X (formerly TWITTER) (Mar. 22, 2023), <https://twitter.com/sama/status/1638635717462200320> [<https://perma.cc/DD2E-BHUV>] (discussing a bug that allowed some users to see the titles of other users' prompt histories).

61. See HARVEY, <https://www.harvey.ai> [<https://perma.cc/T9KM-W9NA>].

Finally, the very fact that lawyers can and should use tools like GPT-4 when doing so can allow them to better represent their clients means that law schools should think seriously about teaching law students how to perform this task.⁶² That, in turn, means that law school instructors should increasingly allow students to use these tools in a subset of their legal research and writing assignments.

B. MECHANICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN USING GPT-4 TO PRODUCE FIRST DRAFTS

One simple way to use tools like GPT-4 to produce legal work product like memos and briefs is to copy and paste any useful materials that the AI has produced in the context of using it to evaluate a case, which is described in Part I. In certain legal writing settings, various answers provided by GPT-4 to the types of questions posed in Part I may prove useful. Indeed, legal briefs and memos often contain basic summaries of cases or elements of cases, particularly when there exists a small universe of potentially relevant cases.

But GPT-4 and similar AI tools have much more substantial power to help lawyers apply the law to facts rather than simply summarizing the law. To accomplish this, one useful approach is to employ a basic Issue-Rule-Application-Conclusion (IRAC) approach to questioning the AI.⁶³

1. Direct Evaluation of Fact Patterns for Legal Issues

One straight-forward but effective first step in producing a memo or similar work product evaluating a specific *scenario* is to describe the scenario with as much specificity as possible to GPT-4,⁶⁴ and then to ask it to evaluate what legal issues the fact pattern raises:

62. See Choi et al., *supra* note 7.

63. Jeffrey Metzler, *The Importance of IRAC and Legal Writing*, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 501, 501–03 (2003).

64. We asked GPT-4 to assume it represents Chris Smith, a professor whose sauce recipe has won several prizes at local fairs. Chris is approached by Don Venaleone, President of Kingpin Supermarkets, who tells Chris “I would like to make your sauce the feature product of the entrance displays in each of Kingpin Supermarkets’ stores.” After assuring Smith that his interest is genuine, Venaleone says “you will need to do a few things for this to work out” such as increasing his production capabilities and developing several variations of the sauce. Several weeks later, Cassandra Carlisle, Kingpin’s head merchandiser, contacts Smith. She asks for a rough estimate of Smith’s manufacturing

*Evaluate what legal issues are raised by the following fact pattern: “[Insert fact pattern]”*⁶⁵

With issue spotting in general, it is often helpful to evaluate a fact pattern for new issues multiple times. The same is true with AIs like GPT-4. For instance, asking GPT-4 this same

costs and “for a tentative delivery date in early September when we can begin placing your product in Kingpin’s Iowa stores.” Once Smith provides a cost estimate, Carlisle states “we are working on documenting terms” but, in the meantime, “you should be preparing to make as much sauce as possible.” Smith then takes a sabbatical from his university job, secures a loan and production facility, develops two additional sauce recipes, and produces 15,000 bottles of sauce. However, Kingpin abandons any plan to carry Smith’s sauce in its stores without explanation.

65. GPT-4’s answer: “Based on the fact pattern presented, several legal issues may arise: (1) Breach of contract: Chris may argue that a contract was formed between him and Kingpin Supermarkets based on the oral agreement with Don Venaleone and the subsequent email exchanges with Cassandra Carlisle. The elements of a contract include offer, acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the terms. If Chris can establish the existence of a contract, he may argue that Kingpin breached the contract by changing the terms of their agreement in the September 2 email. (2) Promissory estoppel: If a court finds that no contract was formed, Chris may still have a claim for promissory estoppel. This doctrine applies when one party relies on the promise of another to their detriment, and it would be unjust not to enforce the promise. In this case, Chris relied on Don’s promises and Cassandra’s email communications, which led him to take significant financial risks and make substantial investments in his business. To succeed in a promissory estoppel claim, Chris would need to demonstrate that he reasonably relied on the promises made by Don and Cassandra, and that his reliance led to substantial detriment. (3) Fraudulent misrepresentation: Chris may argue that Don and/or Cassandra’s statements amounted to fraudulent misrepresentation, which induced him to take significant financial risks. To succeed in a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, Chris would need to show that Don and/or Cassandra made false statements of material fact with the intent to deceive, that Chris reasonably relied on those statements, and that he suffered harm as a result. (4) Unjust enrichment: Chris may also consider pursuing a claim for unjust enrichment against Kingpin Supermarkets. Unjust enrichment occurs when one party benefits at the expense of another in circumstances where it would be unjust for the benefiting party to retain the benefit without compensating the other party. Chris may argue that Kingpin Supermarkets would be unjustly enriched if they do not compensate him for the financial risks and investments he made in reliance on their promises. It is important for Chris to consult with an attorney to discuss the specific facts and circumstances of his situation and determine the best course of action. The attorney may also identify other potential claims or defenses that may be available to Chris based on applicable state law and the specific terms of any written agreements between the parties.”

question multiple times yields new promising legal theories, as the following answer from one such repeat query suggests.⁶⁶

Notably, past studies have indicated that earlier GPT models (particularly ChatGPT) are not always effective at spotting relevant issues in fact patterns on law school exams.⁶⁷ In these studies, however, the AI was not first specifically directed to identify relevant legal issues.⁶⁸ As the above illustration suggests, however, GPT-4 can often do an admirable job of identifying potentially relevant legal issues when provided with complex fact patterns; in this case, GPT-4 identified all of the issues that we identified based on the fact pattern. Importantly, however, that does not mean every issue that GPT-4 identifies will be fruitful; to illustrate, GPT-4 was perhaps over-exuberant in identifying an unjust enrichment theory in the above fact pattern; this appears to be an implausible theory given that Kingpin did not retain any benefits in connection with its dealings with Smith.⁶⁹

2. Direct Application of Rules to Facts for Specific Issues

Once an attorney focuses on a legal issue that they would like to further explore, GPT-4 provides a powerful tool for crafting written material that analyzes that issue based on relevant legal rules. Suppose that the lawyer in the above hypothetical wishes to evaluate the promissory estoppel claim raised by the above fact pattern. One good option for doing so would be to directly ask GPT-4 to perform this analysis. But a better approach is to *directly supply GPT-4 with the relevant legal rules or source material*, which can be identified using the techniques described in Part I, as the following example illustrates:

66. GPT-4's answer: "*Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: Chris could argue that Kingpin, Don Venaleone, and/or Cassandra Carlisle breached their duty to deal with him in good faith and act fairly when they changed the terms of the agreement without explanation or proper negotiation. If a court finds a breach of this duty, Chris might be able to recover damages.*"

67. See Choi et al., *supra* note 7.

68. See *id.*

69. Unjust enrichment generally requires that one party unjustly benefit at the expense of another. See Peter Birks, *Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment*, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1773 (2001) (describing the legal contours of unjust enrichment). That does not appear to be a plausible possibility based on the fact pattern because none of the specified facts indicate that Kingpin was enriched by Smith's actions.

*Evaluate whether [party] has a good promissory estoppel claim. In doing so, assume that promissory estoppel would require [party] to show (1) a clear and definite agreement, (2) proof the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied upon it to his detriment, and (3) a finding that equity supports enforcement of the agreement.*⁷⁰

As GPT-4 accurately indicates, one of the central questions raised by the fact pattern is whether the hypothetical parties ever did, in fact, reach a “clear and definite agreement.” As law professors teach their students, a good method for better understanding this issue is to consider the best arguments on each side of the issue, in the process highlighting the most important facts for each side. GPT-4 is very well positioned to supply these competing arguments:

70. GPT-4’s answer: “Based on the fact pattern and the three elements required for a promissory estoppel claim, let’s analyze whether Chris has a strong case against Kingpin: (1) Clear and definite agreement: This element may be the most challenging for Chris to establish. Although Chris and Don Venaleone had a conversation where Don expressed his interest in featuring Chris’s sauce in Kingpin’s stores, the specifics of the arrangement were not detailed. The subsequent email exchanges also lacked clarity on the terms of the agreement. Kingpin might argue that their discussions were only preliminary negotiations and not a clear and definite agreement. However, Chris could argue that the details provided by Don and the subsequent email exchanges with Cassandra were enough to form a clear and definite understanding of the arrangement. (2) Reasonable reliance: Chris can likely demonstrate that he reasonably relied on Kingpin’s assurances. After the initial conversation with Don and the email exchanges with Cassandra, Chris took significant steps to prepare for large-scale production. He secured a sabbatical from his university, took out a loan, leased a building, purchased equipment, and hired a part-time production assistant. Chris’s actions suggest that he relied on the expectation that his sauce would be featured prominently in Kingpin’s stores, as indicated by their initial discussions. (3) Equity supports enforcement: Chris’s reliance on Kingpin’s assurances led him to invest substantial time, effort, and financial resources into preparing for the deal. He now faces the risk of significant financial losses due to the change in Kingpin’s plans. It could be argued that it would be inequitable for Kingpin to benefit from Chris’s efforts without honoring their initial understanding. Enforcing the agreement through promissory estoppel would prevent Kingpin from taking advantage of Chris’s reliance and placing him in a worse financial position. In conclusion, while Chris may face challenges in establishing a clear and definite agreement, he has a reasonable argument for promissory estoppel based on his reliance and the equities involved. However, the success of such a claim will depend on the specific facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the jurisdiction in which the claim is brought. It is essential for Chris to consult with an attorney to assess the strength of his promissory estoppel claim and determine the best course of action.”

What is the best argument that [party 1] and [party 2] did indeed reach a clear and definite agreement for purposes of a promissory estoppel claim against [party 2]?⁷¹

Now the lawyer working on this matter can ask GPT-4 to supply the best argument on the other side of the ledger:

What is the best argument that [party 1] and [party 2] did not reach a clear and definite agreement for purposes of a promissory estoppel claim against [party 2]?⁷²

71. GPT-4's answer: "*The best argument that Chris Smith and Kingpin reached a clear and definite agreement for purposes of a promissory estoppel claim against Kingpin is based on the totality of their interactions and communications, which could be construed as forming a sufficiently definite understanding of the arrangement.*(1) *The initial conversation between Chris and Don Venaleone: In their conversation, Don expressed a strong interest in Chris's BBQ sauce and proposed that it be the feature product in Kingpin's Iowa stores' entrance displays. He outlined the steps Chris would need to take, such as increasing production capabilities and developing variations of the sauce. This conversation could be interpreted as the foundation of an agreement, with Don expressing Kingpin's intent to enter into a commercial relationship with Chris.*(2) *Subsequent email exchanges: Following the conversation, Chris and Cassandra, Kingpin's Head Merchandiser, exchanged several emails discussing the deal. Cassandra provided Chris with the contact information for Kingpin's distributor and requested an estimate of Chris's costs per bottle, as well as a tentative delivery date. In addition, Cassandra mentioned that they were working on documenting terms with Chris, which could be interpreted as further evidence of Kingpin's intention to solidify their arrangement.*(3) *Chris's actions based on the understanding: Chris took significant steps in reliance on the apparent agreement, including securing a sabbatical, obtaining a loan, leasing a building, purchasing equipment, and hiring a part-time production assistant. These actions demonstrate that Chris understood the arrangement with Kingpin to be definite and binding, and that he acted in accordance with that understanding. While the communications between the parties may lack some specifics, such as the exact quantity of sauce to be purchased or the precise terms of payment, the overall interactions suggest a mutual understanding of a commercial relationship between Chris and Kingpin. Chris could argue that, taken together, these communications and actions formed a clear and definite agreement, which is sufficient for a promissory estoppel claim"*

72. GPT-4's answer: "*The best argument that Chris Smith and Kingpin did not reach a clear and definite agreement for purposes of a promissory estoppel claim against Kingpin would focus on the lack of specificity in the discussions and the absence of a formal written agreement.*(1) *Preliminary negotiations: Kingpin could argue that the conversation between Chris and Don Venaleone, as well as the subsequent email exchanges with Cassandra, were merely preliminary negotiations and not a binding agreement. They could assert that the discussions were intended to explore the possibility of a commercial relationship but were not meant to create a legally enforceable contract.*(2) *Lack of specific terms: The communications between Chris and Kingpin lacked specific*

Having laid out these two sides of the argument, the lawyer can now ask the AI to write an analysis of the legal issue based on whatever conclusion they believe is more plausible (if the assignment is a predictive memo) or based on their client's interests (if the assignment calls for advocacy). In doing so, the lawyer can not only ask the AI to make the best argument for their side, but also to explain why the arguments on the other side fall short:

Write a portion of a legal brief rejecting the best arguments that [party 1] and [party 2] did not reach a clear and definite agreement for purposes of a promissory estoppel claim against [party 2].⁷³

terms, such as the exact quantity of sauce to be purchased, the price per bottle, the duration of the agreement, or the terms of payment. Kingpin could argue that the absence of these essential terms demonstrates that no clear and definite agreement was reached between the parties. (3) Absence of a formal written agreement: In the email exchanges, Cassandra mentioned that they were working on documenting terms with Chris, which could imply that Kingpin intended to formalize the agreement in writing. Kingpin could argue that the absence of a signed, written contract indicates that the parties had not yet reached a clear and definite agreement. They could further contend that Chris's reliance on their informal communications was unreasonable, given the expectation of a formal written agreement. (4) Unilateral action by Chris: Kingpin could argue that Chris's actions in preparing for large-scale production were taken unilaterally and without explicit confirmation of the arrangement from Kingpin. They could assert that Chris should have waited for a more definitive commitment before investing significant resources into the venture. In conclusion, to argue that Chris Smith and Kingpin did not reach a clear and definite agreement for purposes of a promissory estoppel claim against Kingpin, the focus would be on the preliminary nature of the negotiations, the lack of specific terms in the discussions, the absence of a formal written agreement, and the unilateral actions taken by Chris. However, the strength of this argument would depend on the specific facts and circumstances, as well as the legal standards in the relevant jurisdiction."

73. GPT-4's answer:

"I. ARGUMENT

A. The Existence of a Clear and Definite Agreement Between Smith and Kingpin Supports Smith's Promissory Estoppel Claim

Kingpin contends that no clear and definite agreement was reached between the parties, a necessary element for Smith's promissory estoppel claim. However, this contention is without merit. The evidence demonstrates that Smith and Kingpin reached a clear and definite agreement based on the conversation between Smith and Don Venaleone, Kingpin's President, and subsequent communications with Cassandra Carlisle, Kingpin's Head Merchandiser.

1. The Initial Conversation and Subsequent Communications Provide Evidence of a Clear and Definite Agreement

For any element of the argument that the lawyer thinks may be further capable of development, a simple prompt so requesting is effective:

Further develop the section of your prior answer arguing that the Parties' Conduct Supports the Existence of a Clear and Definite Agreement.⁷⁴

The conversation between Smith and Venaleone included an explicit expression of interest in making Smith's sauce the feature product in Kingpin's Iowa stores and a discussion about potentially taking it nationwide. Venaleone provided specific steps for Smith to follow, such as increasing production capabilities, developing variations of the sauce, and completing paperwork later. This level of detail and commitment demonstrates a clear understanding and agreement between the parties.

Subsequent email communications between Smith and Carlisle further support the existence of a clear and definite agreement. Carlisle provided Smith with the distributor's contact information, requested cost estimates and tentative delivery dates, and instructed Smith to prepare for increased production. These communications, taken together, show that the parties intended to be bound by their agreement, even if some details were left to be determined later.

2. The Parties' Conduct Supports the Existence of a Clear and Definite Agreement

Both Smith's and Kingpin's actions following the initial conversation provide strong evidence of a clear and definite agreement. Smith relied on Kingpin's promises and made significant investments in his business, such as obtaining a sabbatical, securing a loan, leasing a building, purchasing equipment, and hiring an employee. Kingpin provided Smith with contact information for the distributor and engaged in ongoing communications that affirmed the agreement and expectations for Smith's production capabilities.

3. The Absence of a Written Contract Does Not Preclude a Finding of a Clear and Definite Agreement

Kingpin argues that the lack of a written contract negates the existence of a clear and definite agreement. However, the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not require a written contract. Its purpose is to prevent injustice when one party reasonably relies on the promises of another party to their detriment. In this case, the oral agreement and subsequent email communications provided a clear and definite framework for the parties' arrangement, and Smith reasonably relied on Kingpin's promises to his significant detriment.

In conclusion, the evidence demonstrates that a clear and definite agreement existed between Smith and Kingpin. Smith's promissory estoppel claim is supported by the initial conversation between the parties, subsequent email communications, and the parties' conduct. The absence of a written contract does not negate the existence of a clear and definite agreement, and Smith's reliance on Kingpin's promises was reasonable. Therefore, this Court should reject Kingpin's argument that no clear and definite agreement was reached for purposes of Smith's promissory estoppel claim."

74. GPT-4's answer: "*The Parties' Conduct Supports the Existence of a Clear and Definite Agreement. Both Smith's and Kingpin's actions following the initial conversation provide strong evidence of a clear and definite agreement. The*

3. Analogizing/Distinguishing Caselaw

By this point, the lawyer assigned to this task has already generated a significant amount of text that can be incorporated directly into a memorandum or brief. A key missing ingredient, however, involves the use of relevant caselaw to substantiate the

parties' conduct, viewed objectively, demonstrates that they understood and intended to be bound by their arrangement.

a. Smith's Actions Demonstrate Reasonable Reliance on the Agreement

Smith took numerous and substantial steps in reliance on the agreement with Kingpin, demonstrating his belief in the existence of a clear and definite agreement.

These actions include:

- *Obtaining a six-month sabbatical from his university position, which resulted in a reduction of his salary by 50%;*
- *Securing a \$125,000 loan, repayable over five years at 3% interest, and using the equity in his home as collateral;*
- *Leasing a portion of a building to increase production capabilities;*
- *Purchasing top-of-the-line equipment to manufacture and package the barbecue sauce;*
- *Developing two additional sauce variations, as requested by Kingpin;*
- *Producing a total of 15,000 bottles of the barbecue sauce in anticipation of fulfilling Kingpin's expectations; and*
- *Hiring a part-time production assistant at \$1,500 per month, terminable at will.*

These significant investments of time, money, and resources demonstrate that Smith reasonably relied on the promises made by Kingpin and viewed their arrangement as a clear and definite agreement.

b. Kingpin's Actions Reflect an Understanding of a Binding Arrangement

Kingpin's conduct also supports the conclusion that a clear and definite agreement existed between the parties. Key actions taken by Kingpin include:

- *Sending Cassandra Carlisle, Kingpin's Head Merchandiser, to communicate with Smith and facilitate the arrangement;*
- *Providing Smith with the contact information for Kingpin's preferred distributor, Larry Jones of ABC Food Distributing, to enable Smith to coordinate production and distribution;*
- *Engaging in ongoing email communications with Smith, discussing cost estimates, tentative delivery dates, and expectations for increased production; and*
- *Encouraging Smith to focus on preparing for the anticipated high demand for his barbecue sauce in Kingpin's stores.*

These actions demonstrate that Kingpin, through its representatives, understood and intended to be bound by the arrangement with Smith.

In conclusion, the conduct of both Smith and Kingpin following their initial conversation strongly supports the existence of a clear and definite agreement. Smith's substantial investments and reliance on Kingpin's promises, as well as Kingpin's active facilitation and communication regarding the arrangement, indicate that the parties intended to be bound by their agreement."

argumentation. While Part I explored how to use AIs like GPT-4 to explore relevant caselaw, good legal argumentation will generally require explicit comparison to relevant cases. Once again, AIs like GPT-4 are powerful tools to produce first drafts of this type of material.

The best way to accomplish this is to introduce the AI to a relevant case using the techniques described in Part I within the content of a Chat that has already asked the AI to consider a specific issue as applied to a specific case. *In brief, the lawyer can first ask GPT to analyze a specific legal issue raised by a fact pattern, they can then ask GPT to analyze how a relevant case analyzes that same legal issue, and they can finally ask GPT to analogize and/or distinguish the base fact pattern to the case.* To illustrate, consider the following set of questions, which merely build off of questions previously introduced above:

- (i) *Evaluate what legal issues are raised by the following fact pattern: “[Insert fact Pattern]”*
- (ii) *Evaluate whether [Party 1] and [Party 2] reached a clear and definite agreement for purposes of a promissory estoppel claim against [Party 2]?*
- (iii) *Why does the court conclude that there was no clear and definite agreement reached by the parties in the following case [Insert full text of case, here Chipokas].*
- (iv) *Argue that the facts involving the [Party 1] case are analogous to the facts of Chipokas, such that a court should find that [Party 2] made no clear and definite agreement with [Party 1].*

So prompted, GPT-4’s argumentation is quite good, and serves as a wonderful starting point for further analogizing the two cases.⁷⁵ Not surprisingly at this point, *GPT-4 also excels at distinguishing relevant cases* when prompted to do so:

75. GPT-4’s answer: “*In arguing that the facts involving the Chris Smith case are analogous to the facts of Chipokas, such that a court should find that Kingpin made no clear and definite agreement with Smith, we can draw several parallels between the two cases: (1) Preliminary negotiations: In both cases, the parties engaged in preliminary negotiations that did not result in a binding agreement. In Chipokas, the Proposal to Lease was found to be a preliminary negotiation document and not a binding lease agreement. Similarly, in the Chris Smith case, any discussions or correspondence between Smith and Kingpin could be considered as preliminary negotiations, rather than a finalized agreement. (2) Conditional or incomplete terms: Just as the Proposal to Lease in Chipokas was conditional upon a final lease acceptable to both parties, any terms discussed between Smith and Kingpin could also be considered conditional or incomplete. If Smith and Kingpin did not agree on all material terms or left certain aspects*

Argue that the facts involving the [Party 1] case are distinguishable from the facts of Chipokas, such that a court should find that [Party 2] made a clear and definite agreement with [Party 1].⁷⁶

of their potential agreement open for further negotiation, then no clear and definite agreement could have been reached.⁽³⁾ Lack of a formal written agreement: In *Chipokas*, the court emphasized the importance of a formal written agreement, as evidenced by the unsigned forty-paragraph lease agreement. In the *Chris Smith* case, if no formal written agreement was ever signed or finalized by both parties, it would support the argument that no clear and definite agreement was reached.⁽⁴⁾ No clear understanding or inducement: In *Chipokas*, the court found that the parties did not have a clear understanding that the proposal was intended to create obligations upon which they could rely. Similarly, in the *Chris Smith* case, if there was no clear understanding or inducement between Smith and Kingpin regarding the expectations and obligations of their potential agreement, it would further support the argument that no clear and definite agreement was reached.⁽⁵⁾ Promissory estoppel not applicable: Just as the court in *Chipokas* found that promissory estoppel did not apply due to the lack of a clear and definite agreement, the same reasoning could apply to the *Chris Smith* case. If the court finds that there was no clear and definite agreement between Smith and Kingpin, then promissory estoppel would not be applicable. By drawing these parallels between the *Chris Smith* case and *Chipokas*, we can argue that the court should find that Kingpin made no clear and definite agreement with Smith, similar to the conclusion reached in *Chipokas*.”

76. GPT-4’s answer: “In arguing that the facts involving the *Chris Smith* case are distinguishable from the facts of *Chipokas*, such that a court should find that Kingpin made a clear and definite agreement with Smith, we can highlight several key differences between the two cases: (1) Nature of the agreement: In *Chipokas*, the dispute involved a commercial real estate lease, which typically requires a formal written agreement. In the *Chris Smith* case, depending on the nature of the agreement between Smith and Kingpin, the need for a formal written agreement might not be as crucial. If the parties’ obligations and expectations are clearly defined in other forms of communication, such as emails or text messages, a court may find that a clear and definite agreement exists. 2. Agreement on material terms: Unlike in *Chipokas*, where the parties failed to agree on certain material terms, Smith and Kingpin may have reached an agreement on all material terms of their potential arrangement. If there is evidence demonstrating that both parties agreed on the essential elements of their agreement, this could support the argument that a clear and definite agreement was reached. 3. Reliance on the agreement: In *Chipokas*, the court found that there was no reasonable reliance by either party on the Proposal to Lease, as it was conditional and incomplete. In the *Chris Smith* case, if there is evidence showing that both Smith and Kingpin reasonably relied on their agreement and acted accordingly, this could support the existence of a clear and definite agreement. 4. Intent to be bound: The court in *Chipokas* found that the parties did not have the intention to be bound by the Proposal to Lease. In contrast, Smith and Kingpin may have expressed or demonstrated their intent to be bound by their agreement through their actions or communications. If the parties’ conduct reflects a mutual understanding and commitment to their arrangement, a court may find that a clear and definite agreement exists. 5. Promissory estoppel applicability: If Smith can demonstrate that he reasonably relied on Kingpin’s promise to his detriment, and

IV. EXTENSIONS

Although Parts I and II focus on lawyers' capacity to use LLMs with conducting caselaw research and drafting conventional types of litigation-oriented work product, LLMs of course have much broader potential to aid the work of lawyers. Below we briefly explore a number of extensions to the analysis above.

A. USING AI AS AN EDITOR

In addition to supplying lawyers with text that can be used in legal work product like memos and briefs, LLMs also can be usefully deployed to serve as an editor of initial drafts that lawyers have crafted.

1. Using LLMs to Generate Thesis Sentences

A fundamental principle of good legal writing is that each paragraph should start with a thesis sentence that clearly and concisely communicates to the reader the primary point of the paragraph. Yet many writers struggle to craft such thesis sentences, in part because they do not always know what their principal point is until after they draft a paragraph. *LLMs like GPT-4 excel at producing thesis sentences with simple prompts* like the following:

Draft a single sentence that conveys the primary point of this paragraph: [insert paragraph].⁷⁷

that it would be unjust not to enforce the agreement, the doctrine of promissory estoppel might apply in the Chris Smith case. This would be unlike Chipokas, where the court found that promissory estoppel did not apply due to the lack of a clear and definite agreement. By highlighting these differences between the Chris Smith case and Chipokas, we can argue that the court should find that Kingpin made a clear and definite agreement with Smith, contrary to the conclusion reached in Chipokas."

77. As one example, we input this paragraph: "After his conversations with Kingpin Smith took significant steps to prepare for large-scale production of his sauce. He also took a sabbatical from his university position as a professor. Then, he took out a loan to help produce the sauce and leased a building. Then Smith purchased equipment to use to manufacture and package his sauce, and he developed several different variants of his traditional sauce recipe. He even hired a part time production assistant to help him with all of this. In other words, Smith reasonably relied on Kingpin's assurances in many ways." GPT-4's proposed thesis sentence was: "*In response to Kingpin's assurances, Smith diligently prepared for large-scale sauce production by taking a sabbatical, securing a loan, leasing a facility, acquiring equipment, diversifying his recipe, and hiring a part-time assistant.*"

2. Using LLMs to Improve Writing Flow and Remove Unnecessary Words

LLMs are also very well suited to improve hastily written text. This is because many of the virtues of effective legal writing are well understood, at least at a high level of generality: effective legal writing eschews unnecessary verbiage, makes clear how each sentence relates to the next, and prizes clarity and readability. These general virtues of legal writing provide the basis for helpful prompts designed to improve one's initial drafts:

Rewrite the following paragraph to eliminate unnecessary words, clarify how each sentence relates to the prior sentence, and increase readability: [Insert your own paragraph].⁷⁸

B. USING AI TO PRODUCE INITIAL CONTRACT DRAFTS

GPT models are extremely well situated to help lawyers draft contracts. A good first step in pursuing this is to enter *any deal terms into GPT directly, and then merely to direct GPT to produce first draft of a contract*:

Draft a contract that meets the following parameters: [Insert deal terms for contract].⁷⁹

78. GPT-4's answer: "*In response to Kingpin's assurances, Smith diligently prepared for large-scale sauce production. He took a sabbatical from his university position, secured a loan, and leased a facility. Subsequently, he acquired manufacturing and packaging equipment, diversified his traditional sauce recipe, and hired a part-time assistant. These actions exemplify Smith's reasonable reliance on Kingpin's assurances. Prior to meeting Kingpin, Smith was a dedicated professor, with sauce-making as a mere hobby. The opportunity to earn substantial income through Kingpin's collaboration motivated him to shift his focus, as he recognized his limited financial prospects from the sauce, which had only garnered a few local awards.*"

79. We instructed GPT-4 to suppose that after Smith's conversations with Kingpin, he decides to hire a food research company, Gourmet Design, Inc., to develop a hot and spicy variation of his recipe. We specified the following deal terms were specified in this example: (1) The hot and spicy sauce must be faithful to the original recipe; so, they both have the same basic character. (2) The original recipe and the hot and spicy recipe must belong to Chris alone. (3) Employees at Gourmet Design who work on the recipe will never be assigned to work on another company's barbecue sauce to be sold anywhere in the Upper Midwest within three years from the signing of the contract. (4) Gourmet Design must complete the recipe design and taste testing between six and eight months

of the contract signing. (5) Gourmet Design will give up ownership rights in the Chris Smith hot and spicy barbecue sauce recipe. (6) Gourmet Design will surrender all design papers to Chris Smith and will agree to keep the recipe confidential. GPT-4's answer:

"This Contract for Recipe Development Services (the 'Contract') is entered into on [Insert Date], by and between Chris Smith, an individual residing at [Address], Frozen Falls (hereinafter referred to as the 'Client'), and Gourmet Design, Inc., a food research company incorporated under the laws of [State], with its principal place of business located at [Address], Big City (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company')."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Client is the owner of a family recipe for barbecue sauce (the 'Original Recipe') and wishes to develop a hot and spicy variation of the Original Recipe (the 'New Recipe');

WHEREAS, the Company is a food research company engaged in the business of creating and testing food recipes for various clients;

WHEREAS, the Client wishes to engage the Company to provide recipe design and testing services to develop the New Recipe, and the Company wishes to provide such services, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:

Services.

1.1 The Company shall provide recipe design and testing services to the Client for the purpose of developing the New Recipe, which shall be a hot and spicy variation of the Original Recipe.

1.2 The Company shall ensure that the New Recipe is faithful to the Original Recipe and retains its basic character.

1.3 The Company shall complete the recipe design and testing services within six (6) months from the date of signing this Contract.

Payment.

2.1 The Client shall pay the Company a total fee of \$[Agreed Amount] for the recipe design and testing services provided under this Contract. The fee shall be payable in installments as follows: 50% upon signing of this Contract and 50% upon completion of the services.

Intellectual Property Rights.

3.1 All rights, title, and interest in and to the Original Recipe and the New Recipe, including but not limited to copyrights, patents, and trade secrets, shall belong solely and exclusively to the Client.

Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure.

4.1 The Company and its employees assigned to work on the New Recipe shall not disclose the Original Recipe or the New Recipe to any third party and shall maintain the confidentiality of such recipes during the term of this Contract and indefinitely thereafter.

4.2 Upon completion of the recipe design and testing services, the Company shall promptly deliver to the Client all design papers and any other materials related to the development of the New Recipe.

Non-Competition.

In cases where the lawyer has a past sample contract that they or their firm has used, or that is common in the industry, the lawyer can direct the AI to pattern the new contract on that precedent:

Pattern the contract draft in this case on the following sample contract: [Insert precedent contract].

These initial templates of a contract are, of course, a very good starting point—but they are only a starting point. Having produced an initial template of a contract, it is up to the lawyer to review it and to prompt GPT to expand on relevant elements and or to address additional issues that are not fully developed in the first draft. For instance, the initial template produced by GPT does not have any terms that provide clear incentives for the parties to produce a commercially successful product. It is therefore worthwhile for the lawyer to ask GPT to draft a clause that can be added to the contract that will provide financial incentives that will encourage the producing party to produce a commercially successful product:

Draft an additional clause that will provide financial incentives for [Party One] to design [the product] so that it proves commercially successful.⁸⁰

5.1 The Company agrees that the employees who work on the New Recipe shall not be assigned to work on any directly competing barbecue sauce to be sold in the Upper Midwest within two (2) years from the signing of this Contract.

Miscellaneous.

6.1 This Contract contains the entire understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements, representations, and understandings, whether oral or written.

6.2 This Contract may be amended or modified only by a written instrument executed by both parties hereto.

6.3 This Contract shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns.

6.4 This Contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of [Governing State].

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Contract as of the date first above written.

Chris Smith (Client) Gourmet Design, Inc. (Company)

By: _____ By: "

80. GPT-4's answer: "Financial Incentive for Commercial Success.

7.1 In addition to the payment specified in Clause 2, the Client agrees to pay the Company a royalty as a financial incentive for the Company to design

Another capacity that GPT has is to identify and clarify the meaning of potentially ambiguous words within the contract. Once again, simply identifying that this is a core potential problem with contracts and asking GPT to rectify this problem is sufficient:

Identify any potentially ambiguous terms in the contract language you've already produced and generate clarifying text that eliminates those ambiguities.⁸¹

the New Recipe in a manner that contributes to its commercial success. The royalty shall be calculated as follows:

7.1.1 The Company shall be entitled to receive a royalty of [X%] of the gross revenue generated from the sales of the barbecue sauce using the New Recipe (the 'Royalty'), subject to a maximum annual cap of \$[Y].

7.1.2 The Client shall provide the Company with quarterly sales reports within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar quarter, which shall detail the gross revenue generated from the sales of the barbecue sauce using the New Recipe during that quarter.

7.1.3 The Client shall pay the Royalty due to the Company within forty-five (45) days following the end of each calendar quarter, based on the gross revenue reported in the sales reports provided under Clause 7.1.2.

7.2 The Royalty payment obligations under this Clause 7 shall commence on the first day of the calendar quarter following the completion of the recipe design and testing services and shall continue for a period of five (5) years.

7.3 The Company shall have the right to audit the Client's books and records relating to the sales of the barbecue sauce using the New Recipe, not more than once per calendar year, upon reasonable notice and during normal business hours, to verify the accuracy of the sales reports and the Royalty payments made under this Clause 7. Any discrepancies discovered during such audit shall be promptly rectified by the Client.

7.4 The payment of the Royalty under this Clause 7 shall not affect the ownership of the intellectual property rights in the Original Recipe and the New Recipe, which shall remain the property of the Client as provided in Clause 3."

81. GPT-4's answer: "Upon reviewing the existing contract language, the following terms or clauses may potentially be ambiguous:

Clause 1.2: 'faithful to the Original Recipe and retains its basic character'

To clarify this clause, the following text can be added:

1.2.1 For the purposes of this Contract, 'faithful to the Original Recipe and retains its basic character' shall mean that the New Recipe shall maintain the core ingredients of the Original Recipe, including but not limited to the mild peppers, tomato base, vinegar, sugar, cinnamon, salt, pepper, and honey, while incorporating additional ingredients necessary to create a hot and spicy flavor profile.

Clause 5.1: 'directly competing barbecue sauce'

To clarify this clause, the following text can be added:

5.1.1 For the purposes of this Contract, a 'directly competing barbecue sauce' shall be defined as any barbecue sauce product developed by or on behalf

These types of prompts to clarify ambiguities, or enhance parties' incentives for reliable performance, can of course be performed on any existing contract forms that lawyers have previously worked with. To accomplish this, merely input the text of an old contract form into GPT, and then ask GPT these questions with respect to the historic contract form.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the power and capabilities of LLMs like GPT will continue to accelerate at breathtaking rates over the coming years. Lawyers and law schools that fail to adapt in response to these innovations not only fail to serve their clients as effectively as possible, but also accelerate their own potential obsolescence. This Article constitutes a first effort to demonstrate how simple prompts and thoughtful use of LLMs can radically transform and facilitate the role of attorneys.

of a third party that is intended for sale in the same product category, namely hot and spicy barbecue sauces, and that is positioned as a direct competitor to the barbecue sauce using the New Recipe in the marketplace, based on factors such as flavor, intended usage, target audience, and price point.

Clause 7.1.1: 'gross revenue'

To clarify this clause, the following text can be added:

7.1.1.1 For the purposes of this Contract, 'gross revenue' shall mean the total amount of revenue generated from the sales of the barbecue sauce using the New Recipe before deducting any expenses, discounts, returns, taxes, or fees.

By incorporating these clarifications, the contract language will be more precise and help to eliminate potential ambiguities."

Navigating AI in the Judiciary: New Guidelines for Judges and Their Chambers

Hon. Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Hon. Allison H. Goddard, Maura R. Grossman, Hon. Xavier Rodriguez, Hon. Scott U. Schlegel & Hon. Samuel A. Thumma

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NAVIGATING AI IN THE JUDICIARY: NEW GUIDELINES FOR JUDGES AND THEIR CHAMBERS

Hon. Herbert B. Dixon, Jr., Hon. Allison H. Goddard, Prof. Maura R. Grossman, Hon. Xavier Rodriguez, Hon. Scott U. Schlegel, and Hon. Samuel A. Thumma

Five judges and a lawyer/computer science professor walked into a bar . . . well, not exactly. But they did collaborate as members of the Working Group on AI and the Courts as part of the ABA's Task Force on Law and Artificial Intelligence to develop the following guidelines for responsible use of AI by judicial officers. The guidelines reflect the consensus view of these Working Group members only, and not the views of the ABA, its Law and AI Task Force, The Sedona Conference, or any other organizations with which the authors may be affiliated.

The authors include:

- Dr. Maura R. Grossman, a Research Professor in the Cheriton School of Computer Science at the University of Waterloo and an Adjunct Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, who serves as a special master in both U.S. state and federal court;
- Hon. Herbert B. Dixon, Jr., Senior Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia;
- Hon. Allison H. Goddard, U.S. Magistrate Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California;
- Hon. Xavier Rodriguez, U.S. District Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas;

- Hon. Scott U. Schlegel, Judge of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal; and
- Hon. Samuel A. Thumma, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeal, Division One.

We hope you will find these guidelines useful in your work as judges. They provide a framework for how you can use AI and Generative AI responsibly as judicial officers.

Guidelines for U.S. Judicial Officers Regarding the Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence

These Guidelines are intended to provide general, non-technical advice about the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) by judicial officers and those with whom they work in state and federal courts in the United States. As used here, AI describes computer systems that perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, often using machine-learning techniques for classification or prediction. GenAI is a subset of AI that, in response to a prompt (*i.e.*, query), generates new content, which can include text, images, sound, or video. While the primary impetus and focus of these Guidelines is GenAI, many of the use cases that are described below may involve either AI or GenAI, or both. These Guidelines are neither intended to be exhaustive nor the final word on this subject.

I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

An independent, competent, impartial, and ethical judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. This foundational principle recognizes that judicial authority is vested solely in judicial officers, not in AI systems. While technological advances offer new tools to assist the judiciary, judicial officers must remain faithful to their core obligations of maintaining professional competence, upholding the rule of law, promoting justice, and adhering to applicable Canons of Judicial Conduct.

In this rapidly evolving landscape, judicial officers and those with whom they work must ensure that any use of AI strengthens rather than compromises the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. Judicial officers must maintain impartiality and an open mind to ensure public confidence in the justice system. The use of AI or GenAI tools must enhance, not diminish, this essential obligation.

Although AI and GenAI can serve as valuable aids in performing certain judicial functions, judges remain solely responsible for their decisions and must maintain proficiency in understanding and appropriately using these tools. This includes recognizing that when judicial officers obtain information, analysis, or advice from AI or GenAI tools, they risk relying on extrajudicial information and influences that the parties have not had an opportunity to address or rebut.

The promise of GenAI to increase productivity and advance the administration of justice must be balanced against these core principles. An overreliance on AI or GenAI undermines the essential human judgment that lies at the heart of judicial decision-making. As technology continues to advance, judicial officers must remain vigilant in ensuring that AI serves as a tool to enhance, not replace, their fundamental judicial responsibilities.

Judicial officers and those with whom they work should be aware that GenAI tools do not generate responses like traditional search engines. GenAI tools generate content using complex algorithms, based on the prompt they receive and the data on which the GenAI tool was trained. The response may not be the most correct or accurate answer. Further, GenAI tools do not engage in the traditional reasoning process used by judicial officers. And, GenAI does not exercise judgment or discretion, which are two core components of judicial decision-making. Users of GenAI tools should be cognizant of such limitations.

Users must exercise vigilance to avoid becoming “anchored” to the AI’s response, sometimes called “automation bias,” where humans trust AI responses as correct without validating their results. Similarly, users of AI need to account for confirmation bias, where a human accepts the AI results because they appear to be consistent with the beliefs and opinions the user already has. Users also need to be aware that, under local rules, they

may be obligated to disclose the use of AI or GenAI tools, consistent with their obligation to avoid ex parte communication.

Ultimately, judicial officers are responsible for any orders, opinions, or other materials which are produced in their name. Accordingly, any such work product must always be verified for accuracy when AI or GenAI is used.

II. JUDICIAL OFFICERS SHOULD REMAIN COGNIZANT OF THE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF AI AND GENAI

GenAI tools may use prompts and information provided to them to further train their model, and their developers may sell or otherwise disclose information to third parties. Accordingly, confidential or personally identifiable information (PII), health data, or other privileged or confidential information should not be used in any prompts or queries unless the user is reasonably confident that the GenAI tool being employed ensures that information will be treated in a privileged or confidential manner. For all GenAI tools, users should pay attention to the tools' settings, considering whether there may be good reason to retain, or to disable or delete, the prompt history after each session.

Particularly when used as an aid to determine pretrial release decisions, consequences following a criminal conviction, and other significant events, how the AI or GenAI tool has been trained and tested for validity, reliability, and potential bias is critically important. Users of AI or GenAI tools for these foregoing purposes should exercise great caution.

Other limitations or concerns include:

- The quality of a GenAI response will often depend on the quality of the prompt provided. Even responses to the same prompt can vary on different occasions.
- GenAI tools may be trained on information gathered from the Internet generally, or

proprietary databases, and are not always trained on non-copyrighted or authoritative legal sources.

- The terms of service for any GenAI tool used should always be reviewed for confidentiality, privacy, and security considerations.

GenAI tools may provide incorrect or misleading information (commonly referred to as “hallucinations”). Accordingly, the accuracy of any responses must always be verified by a human.

III. POTENTIAL JUDICIAL USES FOR AI OR GENAI

Subject to the considerations set forth above:

- AI and GenAI tools may be used to conduct legal research, provided that the tool was trained on a comprehensive collection of reputable legal authorities and the user bears in mind that GenAI tools can make errors;
- GenAI tools may be used to assist in drafting routine administrative orders;
- GenAI tools may be used to search and summarize depositions, exhibits, briefs, motions, and pleadings;
- GenAI tools may be used to create timelines of relevant events;
- AI and GenAI tools may be used for editing, proofreading, or checking spelling and grammar in draft opinions;
- GenAI tools may be used to assist in determining whether filings submitted by the parties have misstated the law or omitted relevant legal authority;

- GenAI tools may be used to generate standard court notices and communications;
- AI and GenAI tools may be used for court scheduling and calendar management;
- AI and GenAI tools may be used for time and workload studies;
- GenAI tools may be used to create unofficial/preliminary, real-time transcriptions;
- GenAI tools may be used for unofficial/preliminary translation of foreign-language documents;
- AI tools may be used to analyze court operational data, routine administrative workflows, and to identify efficiency improvements;
- AI tools may be used for document organization and management;
- AI and Gen AI tools may be used to enhance court accessibility services, including assisting self-represented litigants.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

These Guidelines should be reviewed and updated regularly to reflect technological advances, emerging best practices in AI and GenAI usage within the judiciary, and improvements in AI and GenAI validity and reliability. As of February 2025, no known GenAI tools have fully resolved the hallucination problem, *i.e.*, the tendency to generate plausible-sounding but false or inaccurate information. While some tools perform better than others, human verification of all AI and GenAI outputs remains essential for all judicial use cases.

Ross v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

December 5, 2024, Submitted; February 20, 2025, Decided; February 20, 2025, Filed

No. 23-CM-1067

Reporter

331 A.3d 220 *; 2025 D.C. App. LEXIS 25 **: 2025 LX 77415; 2025 WL 561432

NIYA ROSS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Prior History: [**1] On Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Criminal Division. 2023-CMD-006252. Hon. Hiram E. Puig-Lugo, Trial Judge.

Counsel: Sweta Patel was on the brief for appellant.

Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman, Jasmine Dohemann, Nickolas Reck, and Kevin Birney, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Judges: Before DEAHL, HOWARD, and SHANKER, Associate Judges. Opinion for the court by Associate Judge SHANKER. Concurring opinion by Associate Judge HOWARD at page 20. Dissenting opinion by Associate Judge DEAHL at page 27.

Opinion by: SHANKER

Opinion

[*221] JUDGMENT

This case was submitted to the court on the transcript of record, the briefs filed, and without presentation of oral argument. On consideration whereof, and for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed this date, it is now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that appellant's conviction is reversed and remanded [*222] with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.

Dated: February 20, 2025.

SHANKER, *Associate Judge*: Leaving a dog in a car on a hot day is always inadvisable. But is it always criminal? A statute tells us when it is, and, as with all crimes, the government [**2] must prove the elements of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt with evidence, not with appeals to common knowledge, common sense, or common understandings of right and wrong. *Res ipsa loquitur* is not a doctrine in the criminal law.

In this case, on a hot day in early September 2023, appellant Niya Ross left her dog Cinnamon in her car parked in the shade of a tree, with the windows lowered a few inches, for over an hour. Following a bench trial, Ms. Ross was convicted of animal cruelty in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-1001, 22-1002. At trial, the government presented little if any evidence regarding the temperature within the car, the weather conditions that Ms. Ross's dog could comfortably tolerate, or symptoms of heat-related distress manifested by the dog.

On appeal, Ms. Ross argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. The government responds that it is "common knowledge" that a dog would suffer in the conditions present in Ms. Ross's car that day. Because

we do not believe common knowledge suffices to fill critical gaps in the government's case, we reverse Ms. Ross's conviction and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Viewing [**3] the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial court could have found the following facts. On the hottest September fourth then on record in the District—reaching a high of ninety-eight degrees Fahrenheit¹—Zachary Vasile was walking down N Street, NW, toward a supermarket when he heard "loud," "incessant dog barking." Turning toward the sound, Mr. Vasile noticed a dog—a "doodle" with "very dense sort of curled hair"—alone inside a car with the windows cracked open approximately three to five inches. As Mr. Vasile approached the car, the dog noticed him and stopped barking.

Because of the "very hot" day and the "very loud," "constant[]" nature of the dog's barking, Mr. Vasile "realized this was a potentially dangerous situation for the dog." He shouted for the dog's owner and attempted to open the door of the vehicle, both to no avail. After about "five to six minutes" of shouting, Mr. Vasile called 311 and explained the situation.

The 311 dispatcher sent "fire, animal control, and police" to Mr. Vasile's location, putting out an "all call" for a "level [one] emergency," defined as an animal "actively . . . in distress with a risk of death or great bodily injury." [**4] Firefighters (the first on the scene) initially "looked around, trying to get a view of the dog." They then forced a window further open, unlocked the car, and let the dog out. Shortly thereafter, Aristides Torres—an animal control officer—arrived. Officer Torres scanned the dog's microchip, used the scan results to identify the owner's phone number, and called the number repeatedly [*223] for ten to fifteen minutes. No one answered.

During his efforts, Officer Torres placed the dog inside his van. Once police officers arrived, Officer Torres opened the van to show them the dog. At that time, bodycam footage showed the dog's tongue sticking out, suggesting that the dog was panting.

Mr. Vasile left the scene after approximately forty minutes, during which time the dog's owner did not return to the car. Police officers, however, remained on the scene until Ms. Ross arrived at 6:11 p.m.—around an hour after responders were dispatched in response to Mr. Vasile's call. Officers approached Ms. Ross as she was unlocking the car, asking, "Where's your dog?" After Ms. Ross confirmed the dog belonged to her, officers placed her under arrest. Body-worn camera footage taken during the arrest shows Ms. [**5] Ross's car parked in the shade of an adjacent tree.

The government charged Ms. Ross with one count of cruelty to animals under D.C. Code §§ 22-1001, 22-1002. At a bench trial, Ms. Ross contended that (1) the government failed to prove—particularly in the absence of expert testimony—that the dog suffered as a result of being left in the car and (2) she lacked the requisite intent for a conviction, relying in part on the testimony of a character witness. In support, she pointed out that Mr. Vasile did not testify regarding any symptoms of heat-related distress on the part of the dog. By contrast, Officer Torres affirmatively testified that when he arrived at the scene, the dog "didn't look like it . . . was in distress."

In response, the government referenced evidence showing that the dog was barking incessantly, that the dispatcher treated Mr. Vasile's report as a level one emergency, and that Officer Torres, who had "responded to a dog locked in a [hot] car" more "than [fifty] times," testified that if the dog had been left in the car longer, "it could definitely have been fatal." The government also noted that Ms. Ross—a former pediatric nurse—testified that she had never left a child in a hot car for an hour [**6] because "that's just not right."

¹ The trial court took judicial notice of "a printout from the National Weather Service, including temperature for Washington, D.C., on September the 4th, 2023." Around the time of the incident, the dash thermometer of a responding police cruiser read approximately ninety-seven degrees Fahrenheit.

The trial court found Ms. Ross guilty. It explained that "the fact that Ms. Ross left not one, not two, but four windows rolled down a distance of about three to five inches shows that she knew that there was a plain and strong likelihood that harm might resolve to Cinnamon because of the heat." It also found that there was no justification for Ms. Ross's actions, as she did not remain within earshot of Cinnamon and left her alone for "roughly an hour and [fifteen] minutes," not including "how long [Cinnamon] had been sitting in the car before Mr. Vasile's arrival." Finally, the trial court stated, "[Y]ou don't need expert testimony to conclude that leaving a dog in a hot car for at least an hour and [twenty] minutes is failing to provide the dog with protection and shelter from the weather."

This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Ms. Ross argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain her conviction, presenting two arguments to support this conclusion. First, she contends that, particularly in the absence of expert testimony, the government failed to demonstrate that "the circumstances in which [Cinnamon] was found" caused Cinnamon [**7] to suffer. Second, she attacks what in her view is the absence of evidence that she possessed the required mens rea—general intent with malice.

After discussing our standard of review and the elements of the District's animal cruelty statute, we turn to Ms. Ross's arguments. As we agree with Ms. Ross's first argument, we reverse without reaching her second.

[*224] A. Standard of Review

We review a claim of insufficient evidence *de novo*, considering "all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict[and] according deference to the factfinder to weigh the evidence, determine credibility, and draw justifiable inferences of fact." *Wicks v. United States*, 226 A.3d 743, 746-47 (D.C. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). It follows that, where bench trials are concerned, we "are deferential to the prerogatives and advantages of the trial judge" and "will not disturb the trial judge's factual findings unless we can conclude they were plainly wrong or without evidence to support them." *Augustin v. United States*, 240 A.3d 816, 824 (D.C. 2020). We affirm the trial court's judgment if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." *Rivas v. United States*, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But this review "means more than that there must be some relevant [**8] evidence in the record in support of each essential element of the charged offense"; "[s]light evidence is not sufficient evidence." *Id.* at 134. Indeed, evidence is not sufficient unless it "eliminate[s] the possibility that the [factfinder's] verdict was based on surmise or conjecture." See *Long v. United States*, 156 A.3d 698, 713 (D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Elements of Animal Cruelty

D.C. Code § 22-1001 provides, in relevant part, that anyone with "charge or custody of any animal" who "unnecessarily fails to provide the same with proper food, drink, air, light, space, veterinary care, shelter, or protection from the weather" is guilty of a misdemeanor. And, although § 22-1001 uses the word "knowingly," we have interpreted it to require a mens rea of "general intent with malice." *Dauphine v. United States*, 73 A.3d 1029, 1032-33 (D.C. 2013). So, to sustain Ms. Ross's conviction for animal cruelty, we must find sufficient evidence that (1) she failed to provide Cinnamon with proper protection from the weather, (2) she "had no justification, excuse or recognized mitigation" for her actions, and (3) she "was at least aware of the plain and strong likelihood" that harm may result, *Dauphine*, 73 A.3d at 1032-33 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Where prong one of the above test is concerned, generalized evidence is not sufficient evidence. [**9] Instead, evidence of improper protection from the weather must be particularized to both the dog and situation at hand. See *Jordan v. United States*, 269 A.2d 848, 849 (D.C. 1970) ("In the absence of testimony . . . that the shelter or protection from the weather supplied *this* dog on *this* occasion would cause the dog to suffer, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction." (emphasis added and footnote omitted)).

C. Proper Protection from the Weather

With the preliminaries settled, we turn to Ms. Ross's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the conclusion that she failed to properly protect Cinnamon from the weather. We agree with Ms. Ross that the government's case was insufficient as a matter of law. Although the record supports the conclusion that some dogs, if left in a hot car for some undefined period of time, would suffer, no reasonable finder of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cinnamon suffered or would have suffered on September 4, 2023.

We note at the outset that the evidence presented at trial does not establish two [*225] critical facts: (1) the actual temperature inside the car and (2) the presence of symptoms of heat-related distress in Cinnamon.

The government [**10] does not contend on appeal that it proved either of the above two facts. Instead, it suggests that it could rely on the factfinder to infer those facts by applying its common sense to other evidence in the record. According to the government, it was enough for it to prove only that (1) the temperature outside of the car was approximately ninety-eight degrees Fahrenheit and (2) Cinnamon would have (had she not been released) remained within the car for approximately one hour and twenty minutes.

We disagree. To be sure, a factfinder may, as a general matter, use their common sense and everyday experience to draw "reasonable inferences from the evidence presented in a trial." *Long*, 156 A.3d at 714. But where these "common sense" inferences are grounded in the assumed nonexistence of mitigating facts, they will often "cross[] the line . . . into the prohibited territory of surmise and conjecture." See *id.* at 714-15. Reasonable inferences must be drawn from, and common sense applied with respect to, evidence; inferences and common sense cannot serve as *substitutes* for evidence. See *id.* at 714. Cf. *Galloway v. United States*, 319 U.S. 372, 387, 63 S. Ct. 1077, 87 L. Ed. 1458 (1943).

The facts in *Long* amply illustrate this principle. There, we held that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a [**11] reasonable doubt that a stolen, ten-year-old Dodge Intrepid was worth at least \$1,000 absent evidence of the "cost of the Intrepid when new," "the price [the complainant] paid for it at" auction, or the car's "mileage, maintenance history, or Bluebook value at the time of the robberies." *Long*, 156 A.3d at 714. This was so even though the evidence established that (1) the car was "pretty clean," (2) the robbers were able to drive the car at significant speed during a police chase, (3) the car was operable throughout the more-than-two-year period between when the complainant recovered it and the robbers' trial and (4) the body of the car was in "decent condition, with no significant dents or scratches beyond what one would ordinarily expect to see on a ten-year-old car in a busy urban area." *Id.* In short, where the jury could not rule out the existence of facts that would reduce the value of the car, their "common sense" valuation could not make up the difference.

One might think that a functional car would obviously have been worth more than \$1,000.² That instinct, however, is not [*226] enough; *Long* teaches that a hunch as to whether a fact is obvious—even one supported by common

² We, like the dissent, harbor doubts about whether ChatGPT is "a good proxy for what is, and what isn't, common knowledge." *Post* at 37 n.4. But to the extent the dissent relies on ChatGPT's degree of certainty as to whether leaving a dog in a hot car is harmful, we note that ChatGPT expresses similar certainty in its response to the query, "How much would a pretty clean, operable 2002 Dodge Intrepid with no significant dents or scratches have been worth in 2012?":

sense and everyday experience—does [**12] not suffice where mitigating circumstances could reasonably have been in play. See 156 A.3d at 714-15; see also *Mejia-Cortez v. United States*, 256 A.3d 210, 214 (D.C. 2021) (explaining that "due process generally requires actual proof beyond a reasonable doubt" of each "critical fact," "even where the fact in question may seem incontrovertible"). With this conclusion in mind, we now turn to the case before us.

Where Cinnamon is concerned, a reasonable factfinder would have found that mitigating circumstances could have reasonably been in play. We reach this conclusion for two reasons: (1) the [**13] specific conditions in which Cinnamon was found suggest that the temperature within the car may have been cooler than the unshaded surrounding area and (2) testimony established that Cinnamon manifested no symptoms of heat-related distress despite spending approximately forty minutes inside the car before she was let out.

We begin with the conditions in which Cinnamon was found. We, like our dissenting colleague, would balk at entering a *closed* car, parked in *full sun*, on a summer's day. But we seek out shaded parking and leave windows cracked open to avoid just such an unpleasant circumstance. Here, no witness testified that the car was exposed to direct sunlight, the body-worn camera footage admitted by the government seems to show Ms. Ross's car parked in the shade, and Ms. Ross left all four of the car's windows open between three and five inches.³ It seems to us, therefore, that the interior of the car could well have been cooler than the car's unshaded surroundings. And this possibility, in our view, creates a reasonable doubt as to whether Cinnamon was enduring harsh conditions inside the car.

Our conclusion in this regard is bolstered by Officer Torres's testimony that, despite [**14] having spent approximately forty minutes inside the car, Cinnamon "looked fine," did not appear "in distress," and seemed in good health. If the interior of the car were in fact hot enough to cause a dog like Cinnamon to suffer, we would expect Cinnamon to have manifested at least some symptoms of exposure to heat. Indeed, in each of the out-of-jurisdiction cases in which an appellate court has found the evidence sufficient to sustain an animal-cruelty conviction for leaving a dog in a hot car, the dog presented just such symptoms. See *State v. Butler*, 175 N.H. 444, 293 A.3d 191, 194 (N.H. 2022) (explaining that the confined dog post-rescue registered an internal temperature of "over 105 degrees" and required "24-hour-care" in a "veterinary hospital"); *State v. Washburn*, 325 A.3d 136, 143 (Vt. 2024) (referencing the confined dog's "panting," "swollen" tongue, and diagnosis with the "early stages of heat exhaustion"); *City of Beachwood v. Pearl*, 2018- Ohio 1635, 111 N.E.3d 620, 636 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (relying on testimony that the confined dogs were "panting profusely with very dry, hot tongues," were "beginning to become distressed," and were "showing signs of heatstroke or dehydration").⁴ The absence of such symptoms [**227] here cements our conclusion that a reasonable factfinder must have had a reasonable doubt in this case.⁵

In 2012, a 2002 Dodge Intrepid in pretty clean, operable condition with no significant dents or scratches would have likely been worth between **\$3,000 and \$5,000**.

The exact price would have depended on factors such as mileage, location, and the specific condition of the car (interior, mechanical health, etc.). For instance, a lower-mileage model with a well-maintained engine could have been closer to the higher end of that range, while a higher-mileage model might have been valued closer to the lower end. Generally, as a mid-size sedan from 2002, it would not have been fetching a premium price by 2012, but it still had decent value as an affordable used car.

Note that \$3,000 (ChatGPT's *minimum* price) is significantly above the \$1,000 threshold at issue in *Long*. ChatGPT's analysis, therefore, does not correspond to at least one of our sufficiency decisions.

³ The trial court viewed the fact that the windows were lowered as evidence of Ms. Ross's knowledge that leaving a dog in a car on a hot day is dangerous, but the fact certainly undermines any assumption that the temperature inside the car soared as it would in a completely closed car.

⁴ The dissent points out that in these three cases, our sister courts found the evidence sufficient despite the dogs having been "left in cars for both briefer periods and on cooler days." *Post* at 40. This critique misses the mark—we are not suggesting that no dog left in a car on a ninety-eight degree day for an hour and twenty minutes will suffer. Instead, we contend that because,

Before turning to the response of the government [^{**15}] and the dissent, we pause to underscore why *Long* and *Mejia-Cortez* encourage caution where a factfinder relies on "common sense" assumptions: what we believe to be true may not be so. Take the inference that shade and ventilation could not have kept the temperature of Ms. Ross's car within a tolerable range. A Department of Energy website suggests that "air temperatures directly under trees can be as much as 25°F cooler than air temperatures above nearby blacktop." *Landscaping for Shade*, U.S. Dep't Energy, <https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/landscaping-shade>; <https://perma.cc/DB76-HYJ6>. If the Department of Energy's estimate is correct, the temperature inside of the shaded car could have been seventy-three degrees Fahrenheit—twenty-five degrees cooler than the temperature recorded by the police car. Or, to give another example, the government suggests that Cinnamon's fur acted "as an additional layer that retains heat," but the American Kennel Club explains that many dogs with apparently thick fur have double coats that, by creating an insulating effect, in fact help keep them "cool in hot weather." Harriet Meyers, *Is It OK to Shave Your Dog's Coat in Summer*, American Kennel Club, <https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/health/is-it-ok-to-shave-your-dog/>; [^{**16}] <https://perma.cc/PVH5-B477>. Cinnamon's fur thus might cut against the government.

We express no opinion on the accuracy of the facts asserted by the above sources; adversarial testing at trial could well have debunked them. We cite them only to support the following point. When a factfinder engages in "common sense" adjudication in place of adjudication grounded in evidence, it creates a greater risk that its judgment will rest on factual error—the exact sort of risk that the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" was designed to reduce. See *Rivas*, 783 A.2d at 133.⁶

The government and the dissent respond to our conclusion that the evidence was insufficient in two ways.

First, they dispute our conclusion that Cinnamon manifested no symptoms of heat-related distress. For its part, the government suggests that Cinnamon "showed [^{*228}] outward signs of distress given her incessant barking." But the government and Ms. Ross offer equally plausible, competing explanations for Cinnamon's barking—the government reads it as a cry for relief from the heat, while Ms. Ross suggests it stemmed from separation anxiety. As neither we nor the trial court speak dog—and the government offered no witness who purported [^{**17}] to do so—we are not convinced that a reasonable factfinder, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, could adopt the government's interpretation to the exclusion of Ms. Ross's.⁷

despite being left within a car for a longer period and on a hotter day than those other dogs, Cinnamon did not manifest their symptoms, we see a reasonable probability that Cinnamon was differently situated from those other dogs. Put differently, the absence of symptoms of heat exhaustion in Cinnamon reinforces the conclusion that mitigating circumstances (e.g., shade, ventilation) were at play in her case.

⁵ Because this holding alone suffices to reverse Ms. Ross's conviction, we need not address Ms. Ross's contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she acted with malice.

⁶ The dissent recognizes that what a factfinder considers to be common knowledge may prove incorrect. We cannot agree, however, with the dissent's implied solution—that a factfinder need only reexamine its assumptions when faced with evidence that "actually undermines or contradicts [them]." See *post* at 37. That contention runs headlong into the proposition, recognized by the trial court, that a criminal defendant is "not required to prove anything." See also *Porter v. United States*, 826 A.2d 398, 407 (D.C. 2003) ("[E]very defendant in a criminal trial has a right not to testify or not to produce any evidence, and the burden of proving guilt rests with the government."). We thus find the dissent's reliance on Ms. Ross's failure "to offer any contradictory evidence" ill-taken. *Post* at 30.

⁷ At the risk of sounding like a broken record, the government's "common sense" inference regarding the cause of Cinnamon's barking again appears to rest on a shaky foundation. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals does not list barking as a symptom of heatstroke in dogs. *Dog Heatstroke Treatment*, RSPCA, <https://www.rspca.org.uk/adviceandwelfare/pets/dogs/health/heatstroke>; <https://perma.cc/9SUR-TZUW>. By contrast, the American Kennel Club lists "barking" as indicative of separation anxiety. Randa Kriss, *Anxiety in Dogs: Signs, Symptoms, Treatment*, American Kennel Club, <https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/health/treating-dog-anxiety/>; <https://perma.cc/6KBU-VJ7M>. To reiterate, however, we do not rely on this extra-record evidence for purposes of resolving this appeal.

The dissent, rather than rely on Cinnamon's barking, cites body-worn camera footage (taken while Cinnamon was inside Officer Torres's van) that it contends shows Cinnamon "panting heavily." *Post* at 41. It also notes that Officer Torres identified excessive panting as a sign of heat-related distress. We, however, think that Officer Torres is the better judge of what constitutes excessive panting. And Officer Torres reported no signs of distress when he examined Cinnamon. We do not believe that our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government requires us to supplant a diagnosis made by an animal control officer present at the scene with our own "common sense."

Second, the government and the dissent contend that Officer Torres's testimony filled any record gaps regarding the conditions within Ms. Ross's car. So, let's look at that testimony. Officer Torres testified that "dogs locked in cars can be fatal, given [*18] the time frame of how long they've been in a car." He explained that the temperature inside a car, depending on its time of exposure, can be "double" the exterior temperature. Finally, he stated that if Cinnamon had been left in the car for longer, "it could definitely have been fatal."

That's a lot of caveats. We do agree, as a matter of common sense, with the thrust of Officer Torres's testimony. Yes, the interior of a car *can*, depending on the car's degree of exposure to the elements, become hotter than the exterior temperature. And yes, locking a dog in a car *can* be fatal, depending on how long the dog remains in the car and how hot the car's interior becomes. Those propositions are but truisms. What is missing from Officer Torres's testimony is specifics. For how much longer did Cinnamon need to be left in the car? At what interior temperature does sustained exposure pose a risk of health consequences? Officer Torres did not say. And even if he had said, he had no way of knowing whether those thresholds were reached in Cinnamon's case. How could he? After all, he (1) "didn't inspect the vehicle" and (2) thought Cinnamon "looked fine."

At bottom, Officer Torres's testimony rests [**19] on similar assumptions to those we rejected above. To us, therefore, his testimony cannot fill the gaps we have identified.⁸ Accordingly, we hold fast to our conclusion [*229] that the evidence presented in this case was insufficient.

By reaching this holding, we in no way intend to question the actions taken by Mr. Vasile, the firefighters, Officer Torres, and the responding police officers. To the contrary, we commend them for their heroic efforts; where a situation could be dangerous for an animal like Cinnamon, we hope all would respond just as Mr. Vasile did. And let us repeat: leaving a dog in a car on a hot day is at a minimum ill-advised. The question here, though, is whether it was *criminal*. And where criminal sanctions are concerned, "could be" is not enough. We thus reverse Ms. Ross's conviction.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.

So ordered


[*238contd]

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The page numbers of this document may appear to be out of sequence; however, this pagination accurately reflects the pagination of the original published document.]

Appendix A

[*239]

⁸We do not think we are being too stingy with respect to Officer Torres's testimony. After all, we have not created the requirement that the government's showing be particularized to the circumstances involved in the alleged cruelty out of whole cloth—that requirement flows from our statements in *Jordan*. See 269 A.2d at 849 (noting that the factfinder's determination of guilt must focus on "the shelter or protection from the weather supplied *this* dog on *this* occasion" (emphasis added)).



[*240]

Appendix B



[*241]

Appendix C



Concur by: HOWARD

Concur

[*229contd]

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The page numbers of this document may appear to be out of sequence; however, this pagination accurately reflects the pagination of the original published document.]

HOWARD, *Associate Judge*, concurring: I join the majority opinion and write separately only to address a point of significant interest, raised by the writings of my colleagues, which together represent the first [****20**] published discussion involving the use of AI tools in decision making at this court. Following in the recent footsteps of Judge Newsom from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the dissent makes use of the ChatGPT large language model artificial intelligence tool by OpenAI, and the majority opinion responds in-kind to contrast the effort. See *post* at 37-39 & nn.4-5; *ante* at 11 n.2. Deferring discussion to an opinion with precedential force, the dissent points to Judge Newsom's thoughtful discussion in the *Snell* case. See *Snell v. United Specialty Ins. Co.*, 102 F.4th 1208, 1221-35 (11th Cir. 2024) (Newsom, J., concurring). I write, since we have broached the topic, to highlight a few brief points not addressed in Judge Newsom's insightful concurrence, that I have considered personally and as part of our D.C. Courts AI Task Force, which I find important considerations in judicial and court use of AI tools.

To be clear, I cast no aspersion on the use of AI by my colleagues. I find it interesting. AI tools are proliferating and we ignore them at our own peril. Not only for the concerning capabilities they now give parties with ill intent,¹ but for

¹ Such as the ever-increasing ability to falsify evidence, like images, audio, and video, and sow disinformation in and outside of the courtroom. A prominent example is the memorable "deep fake" image, generated by a construction worker playing with an AI tool, of Pope Francis in a particularly stylish puffer coat, which appeared indistinguishable from reality and took the internet by storm. See Drake Bennett, *AI Deep Fake of the Pope's Puffy Coat Shows the Power of the Human Mind*, Bloomberg (April 6, 2023, 7:00 AM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-04-06/pope-francis-white-puffer-coat-ai-image-sparks-deep-fake-concerns>; <https://perma.cc/3D6V-ZCFW>. A cogent description and discussion of these concerns can be found in the interim guidance from the National Center for State Courts. AI Rapid Response Team, Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts., *AI and the Courts: Digital Evidence and Deepfakes in the Age of AI* (June 2024), https://www.ncsc.org/_data/assets/pdf_file/0019/101683/ncsc-ai-rrt-deepfakes-june-2024.pdf; <https://perma.cc/86VE-3WGM>.

the great utility such tools could potentially provide in easing the strain on our increasingly [*230] overburdened [**21] courts.²

AI tools are more than a gimmick; they are coming to courts in various ways, and judges will have to develop competency in this technology, even if the judge wishes to avoid using it. Courts, however, must and are approaching the use of such technology cautiously. Specific use cases are being considered and we must always keep in mind the limits of different AI tools in how and when we use them, particularly with regard to security, privacy, reliability, and bias, to ensure ethical use.

Broadly, an AI system can be susceptible to bias at multiple points in its execution.³ Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 2.2 and 2.3, dealing with impartiality and fairness and bias, prejudice, and harassment, are potentially implicated in reliance on a system infected with bias. Ignorance of the technology seems like little defense in consideration of the duty of competence in Rule 2.5. Other issues abound, but security and confidentiality of court information are particular concerns. Accordingly, before using an AI tool a judicial officer or staff member should understand, among many other [**22] things, what data the AI tool collects and what the tool does with their data.

The quote has many attributions that "if it is free, you are the product." Many AI tools benefit from what we feed into them, documents, prompts, etc., virtually every aspect of our interaction trains and hones such tools. That is part of the early mover advantage of ChatGPT in particular, which blew away previous records to reach one million users in five days⁴—and 100 million within two months of going live.⁵ As of January 30, 2025, it was estimated to have approximately 300 million weekly users.⁶ It is hard to imagine a company that could afford to pay that many people to test and develop their model. However, such a system [*231] raises serious practical and ethical issues for a court. Security is a preeminent concern. I briefly look at a few hypotheticals in the context of this court to illustrate.

First, take the use case of a judge utilizing an AI tool to summarize briefs filed with the court well in advance of oral argument—a [**23] practice, along with summarizing voluminous records, that some AI tools appear to be quite adept at. It is the practice of this court to announce the members of a particular panel of judges the week before an

² The D.C. Courts are such a system. It has been well covered in the news for several years that we face historic vacancies. The D.C. Superior Court has in the recent past, and may soon again, faced double digit vacancies. This court has been without a full complement of judges for more than a decade. Our current two-judge vacancy represents nearly one-third of our court. Compounding this issue is an ever-dwindling number of senior judges—former active judges who commit to continued public service—seasoned veterans who are valuable resources in accomplishing the work of this court. And, structurally, this court faces the challenge of having the same nine judgeships over the court's approximate fifty-five-year existence, while the courts and agencies we review have grown to numbers of judges and administrative adjudicators regularly exceeding 100 each. Compare D.C. Code § 11-702 (1973 Ed.), with D.C. Code § 11-702 (composition of D.C. Court of Appeals); see D.C. Code § 11-903 (composition of D.C. Superior Court); D.C. Superior Court Judges, D.C. Cts., <https://www.dccourts.gov/superior-court/judges>; <https://perma.cc/Q6GP-VMGL>; D.C. Public Salary Information, D.C. Dep't Hum. Res., <https://dchr.dc.gov/public-employee-salary-information>; <https://perma.cc/L8Q6-KLJA> (listing all D.C. employees).

³ IBM offers a relatively short, simplified breakdown of AI bias. James Holdsworth, *What is AI Bias?*, IBM (Dec. 22, 2023), <https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/ai-bias>; <https://perma.cc/HL7S-YJW7>.

⁴ Bernard Marr, *A Short History of ChatGPT: How We Got to Where We Are Today*, Forbes, (May 19, 2023, 1:14 AM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2023/05/19/a-short-history-of-chatgpt-how-we-got-to-where-we-are-today/>; <https://perma.cc/5LCV-8TNH>.

⁵ Krystal Hu, *ChatGPT Sets Record for Fastest-Growing User Base - Analyst Note*, Reuters (February 2, 2023, 10:33 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/technology/chatgpt-sets-record-fastest-growing-user-base-analyst-note-2023-02-01/>; <https://perma.cc/425D-HGQU>.

⁶ *ChatGPT / OpenAI Statistics: How Many People Use ChatGPT?*, Backlinko, <https://backlinko.com/chatgpt-stats>; <https://perma.cc/3QY3-ZN59> (last updated January 30, 2025).

oral argument. Should a judge be using an AI tool that trains on the data they submitted, they have now surrendered data which includes—at bare minimum—the submitted data, i.e. the briefs of the parties, and potentially personally identifying data, i.e. a username, IP address, and email address. Data which, reviewed together, could expose the judge's involvement on the panel to individuals and systems with access to that data before that information is public.

Next, fast-forward past argument and assume our hypothetical technophile jurist decides they will have the AI tool aid them in the preparation of a decision. AI tools offer many potential use cases here. For one, perhaps with careful prompting, detailing the types of facts or story that is desired, the AI tool could be used to pull from the record and produce a first draft of the factual rendition section of the decision. It could develop an initial statement of the standard of review and controlling law. In varying degrees [^{**24}] of quality, depending on the tool and inputs, it could formulate a first take at some analysis. However, again, should the AI tool be training itself on the data, someone with access to the data would have access to judicial deliberative information and potentially personally identifying login/user information that could identify the judge as well. Of even more concern, as the data trains the tool, another user could stumble upon it or some aspects of it regurgitated by the AI tool. Even if the odds are miniscule, confidential judicial deliberative information has potentially leaked out ahead of a decision in this scenario.

Consider further the scenario that any of the material used in either prior hypothetical contained sensitive information that would otherwise be subject to redaction, i.e. social security numbers, account numbers, minor's names, etc. If unredacted briefs or records were loaded into the AI tool, it would be an instant failure of the court's duty to protect such information. Three hundred million users, in the scenario of ChatGPT, described above, would potentially have access.

I pause briefly here to note that such concern does not appear to arise from the use of AI [^{**25}] in this decision. The dissent's generalized hypothetical questioning, without more, does not strike me as remotely unique to this case in a way that could even inadvertently expose deliberative information. The majority's use of ChatGPT provides comparison by prompting the tool against the facts of a previous case for analysis. It strikes me that the thoughtful use employed by both of my colleagues are good examples of judicial AI tool use for many reasons—including the consideration of the relative value of the results—but especially because it is clear that this was no delegation of decision-making, but instead the use of a tool to aid the judicial mind in carefully considering the problems of the case more deeply. Interesting indeed.

The previous examples that I described as potential improper use of an AI tool, however, could be accomplished with the use of an AI tool with robust security and privacy protections. Even more exciting, AI companies have begun to announce the [^{*232}] release of government oriented tools which promise to provide such protections and allow for such potential use cases.⁷

As state courts [^{**26}] across the country cautiously consider these issues, the National Conference of State Courts has taken a lead in coordinating efforts. It has put together an AI Rapid Response Team and created a policy consortium, constantly updating resources. See *Thomson Reuters Institute/NCSC AI Policy Consortium*, Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts., <https://www.ncsc.org/consulting-and-research/areas-of-expertise/technology/tri-ncsc-ai-policy-consortium>; <https://perma.cc/2Z66-GXB4>. And the D.C. Courts have not stood idly by, creating our D.C. Courts AI Task Force and partnering with the National Conference of State Courts. See *District of Columbia Courts Administrative Order: Artificial Intelligence Task Force of the District of Columbia Courts*, D.C. Cts. (March 5, 2024), https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/Artificial_Intelligence_Task_Force_Administrative_Order_Final.pdf;

⁷ A particularly interesting discussion of the most recent announcements with thoughtful comments on the potential for courts—complete with what appears to be an AI generated image of judge with a holographic heads-up-display—comes from Judge Scott Schlegel of Louisiana. See *The Wait May Be Over: Government AI Products Could Give Courts the Green Light*, [sch]Legal Tech, (February 5, 2025), <https://judgeschlegel.substack.com/p/the-wait-may-be-over-government-ai>; <https://perma.cc/5KY5-7TD4>.

<https://perma.cc/JCU7-V9FW>. As the use of AI begins to appear at the D.C. Courts, litigants and the citizens of the District can be assured that cautious and proactive thought is being directed by our judges and D.C. Courts team members, toward the beneficial, secure, and safe use of AI technology.

Dissent by: DEAHL

Dissent

DEAHL, *Associate Judge*, dissenting: [**27] Niya Ross left her dog alone in a parked car in ninety-eight degree heat for an hour and twenty minutes. Ross parked her car facing directly into the sun, with minimal shade coming off a nearby tree, and left during the hottest portion of the hottest September 4 on record in the District's history—the late afternoon (from about 4:50 to 6:10 p.m.). Those are probably all the facts necessary for most people to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross's actions created a "plain and strong likelihood" that her dog would be harmed. *See Dauphine v. United States*, 73 A.3d 1029, 1033 (D.C. 2013) (quoting *Russell v. United States*, 65 A.3d 1172, 1184 (D.C. 2013)). My colleagues conclude otherwise, ruling that *no* rational factfinder could draw that conclusion. I disagree and dissent.

There was considerable record evidence supporting the trial court's guilty verdict for misdemeanor cruelty to animals, beyond the barest facts noted above (which alone strike me as sufficient to support the guilty verdict). All of the relevant witnesses and responders, other than Ross herself, recognized that leaving a dog in a car on a blazing hot summer day—even with the windows cracked a few inches, and even if only for a far shorter period than it turned out to be—required an immediate response to avoid harm to the dog. [**28] A bystander, Zachary Vasile, was the first on the scene. He heard the dog's "very loud" and "incessant barking," explaining that—aside from it being "very hot" that day—it was "[t]he constantness of" the barking that "gave [him] concern." Vasile understood that "this was a potentially dangerous situation for the dog." He spent several minutes trying to track down the dog's owner, then tried but failed to open the car's doors (risking at least a nasty confrontation on the owner's return). When that didn't work, he called 311.

[*233] The 311 receptionist then "put [Vasile] to a dispatcher" who put out "a level 1 emergency call"—meaning the situation posed a "risk of death or great bodily injury"—and dispatched "fire, animal control, and police" to the scene in light of the temperature that day. At the time of that dispatch Ross was still an hour away from returning to her car. Firefighters arrived first, with several police and animal control officers arriving shortly thereafter. The firefighters acted quickly: one tried to unlock the driver's side door by attempting to reach through its cracked window, and when his arm wouldn't fit, he manually forced the window down so that they could unlock [**29] the door and free the dog.

Animal control officer Aristides Torres then arrived on the scene shortly after Cinnamon had been removed, and he placed the dog in the back of his animal control vehicle (equipped with dog crates). Video footage of the dog shortly after she had been freed from the car and placed in Torres's animal control vehicle (at 5:29 p.m.) showed her panting heavily, and it would still be another forty-plus minutes before Ross returned to her car.

Torres provided the most critical testimony in support of the verdict. Torres testified that in his eight years on the job he had responded to calls for dogs locked in cars more than fifty times, largely in the summer months. He explained that the temperature inside of a car can "increase [to] double the temperature" of the external temperature, "[d]epending on the time" it is parked. And he also explained that it was "important to get [Cinnamon] out of the car" when the firefighters did because otherwise "it could definitely have been fatal." My colleagues posit that Torres's testimony in this respect "rests on . . . assumptions," *ante* at 18, but eight years as an animal control officer is called experience, not assumptions. [**30] And if Ross wanted to cast some doubt on Torres's testimony or test its foundations, cross-examination was the time to do it (not in a sufficiency appeal); I can understand why defense counsel didn't want to do that given how readily a longtime animal control officer could presumably shore up that opinion and strengthen the government's case. Ross also had an opportunity to offer any contradictory evidence in

the defense case, but failed to do so. The trial court could thus reasonably rely on Torres's testimony as ironclad support for the conclusion that Ross had put her dog in harm's way.

All of that evidence was further supplemented by a heavy dose of common sense. Factfinders "need not check their common sense at the courthouse doors," and "are permitted to use the saving grace of common sense and their everyday experience to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented." *Covington v. United States*, 278 A.3d 90, 99 (D.C. 2022) (internal marks omitted) (quoting *Long v. United States*, 156 A.3d 698, 714 (D.C. 2017)). They are not tabula rasa bots whose only inputs are the evidence in the trial record; they can bring their prior knowledge and experiences to bear on their verdicts. And it is common knowledge that parked cars can quickly get far hotter than the ambient temperatures [**31] outside (just as Torres testified)—most people have opened a car door on a hot day to a blast of heat and a scorching steering wheel and belt buckles.¹ It is similarly common knowledge that dogs with "dense" fur like Cinnamon are particularly vulnerable to heat. While I'm quite confident that any human would suffer if left in a car for an hour and twenty minutes in ninety-eight degree heat, if you [234] put a dense fur coat on them, my confidence skyrockets.

Based on all of the above evidence, and the common sense inferences from it, the trial court quite rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross did not provide Cinnamon with "proper shelter or protection from the weather," a misdemeanor offense per D.C. Code § 22-1001. Really, who could doubt that? As the trial court opined, "you don't need expert testimony to conclude that leaving a dog in a hot car for at least an hour and 20 minutes is failing to provide the dog with protection . . . from the weather."

The majority offers four main responses, but they are unpersuasive.

First, the majority suggests that maybe cars heat up to dangerous temperatures only when left "in *full sun*" with windows fully up, hypothesizing that the interior of Ross's car [**32] might actually have been *cooler* than outside because her windows were cracked and there was some light shade. *Ante* at 12-13. I invite them to test out that theory on the next ninety-something degree day in the District, but there is no need to dissect the fallacies underlying it here. Suffice it to say that nobody has ever left their car parked on the street for an extended period on a hot day and then opened their car door to a gust of cool refreshing air, no matter how much shade they parked in. Some shade or cracked windows might slightly ameliorate how quickly and drastically a car heats up, but they will not reverse the effect. While the majority correctly notes that a defendant is not required to prove anything, neither is the government "required to negate every possible inference of innocence before an accused may be found guilty of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt." *Hebron v. United States*, 837 A.2d 910, 911-12 (D.C. 2003) (en banc) (quoting *Smith v. United States*, 809 A.2d 1216, 1221 (D.C. 2002)). Prosecutors do not need to debunk every imaginative hypothesis one might later dream up.

The majority also fails to view the record in the light most favorable to the government, as we are required to do in this posture, when it posits that Ross parked in the shade. The video evidence [**33] shows otherwise. It shows Ross's car facing directly into the beating sun, leaving her windshield to act as a giant magnifying glass for the sun's rays. There was at most a light smattering of shade hitting some parts of her car, as depicted in the appendices to this opinion, which are still images taken from the video exhibits.² And most [235] importantly, the government

¹ As a born-and-raised Arizonan, I've surely had more frequent, vivid, and painful experiences with this phenomenon than most people.

² Appendix A shows Ross and the conditions around her car when she and her companion returned to it at 6:11 p.m. Notice that the sun is hitting the street directly, with no shade, all around Ross's car (her car, her companion, and Ross herself are casting the only shadows on the street around her car, though there are some reflections and glare on her car hood that could be mistaken for shadows). Appendix B comes from the vantage point of Torres's animal control vehicle, which was parked front bumper to front bumper with Ross's car, and it shows the tree that is the only candidate for providing some shade to Ross's car. The reader will notice how its shadow is being cast away from the street and onto the nearby building. Some stray branches may have jutted out enough to lend some light shade to Ross's car, but it wouldn't have been much. Appendix C confirms the point. It shows the sun very directly hitting the back of Torres's animal control vehicle (i.e., roughly as it would have hit Ross's front

produced an experienced animal control officer who was on the scene and thus familiar with all of those relevant conditions, and he opined without refutation that Ross's dog might have died had she not been removed from the car some forty-five minutes before Ross's eventual return. That is enough to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross's actions created a plain and strong likelihood that Cinnamon would be harmed but for responders' interventions.

Second, the majority invokes a countervailing principle to the one I have relied upon above, that factfinders can bring their common sense to bear on verdicts. The majority counters—citing to *Mejia Cortez v. United States*, 256 A.3d 210 (D.C. 2021), and *Long*, 156 A.3d at 714—that "even where the fact in question may seem incontrovertible," "inferences and common sense cannot serve as *substitutes* for evidence." *Ante* at 10. That generic principle [*34] is too broad if taken at face value; common sense can obviously fill some evidentiary gaps in a record, as our precedents make clear. For instance, there was no direct evidence at trial that a dog is an "animal" covered by the animal cruelty statute, but I assume the majority agrees with me that common sense can supply that link. And if Ross had intentionally broken each of Cinnamon's legs with a baseball bat, or stabbed her in the abdomen with a buck knife, I hope the majority agrees that no further proof would be necessary to establish a plain and strong likelihood that those actions would harm the dog (despite its rhetoric that "[r]es ipsa loquitur" has no role to play in the criminal law).

The question always comes down to whether the particular fact at issue is truly common sense enough to be inferred from the record evidence, and both *Mejia-Cortez* and *Long* quite sensibly answered in the negative on their particular facts. The disputed fact at issue in *Mejia-Cortez* was whether the Washington Metro and Transit Authority "had been issued a license to sell alcoholic beverages," and in that case the government did not even "suggest that it could satisfy its burden by pointing to the [*35] obviousness" of that fact. 256 A.3d at 214-15. In *Long* the particular fact was whether a decade-old 2002 Dodge Intrepid was worth more than \$1000 when there was no direct evidence of its value and no circumstantial evidence about its mileage, maintenance, or mechanical condition—aside from it being operable—factors which could obviously drastically affect its value. 156 A.3d at 714. While we held that one could not rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the car was worth more than \$1000 on that record, as necessary to support a felony receipt of stolen property offense, we directed entry of a misdemeanor receipt of stolen property conviction, because of course the car had *some* value despite no direct evidence of that. We also acknowledged our prior holding that one could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a relatively new car "clearly had a fair market value of more than \$250," even absent direct evidence on the point. *Id.* at 714-15 (discussing *Curtis v. United States*, 611 A.2d 51 (D.C. 1992)).

Both *Mejia-Cortez* and *Long* strike me as sensible because the disputed facts in those cases were not nearly so evident as the challenged fact here—that leaving a dog in a car for an hour and twenty minutes in ninety-eight degree heat creates a plain and strong [*36] likelihood of some harm to the animal. Had the government charged Ross with felony cruelty to animals, which would have required proof of a "substantial risk of death" or serious bodily injury, D.C. Code § 22-1001(c)-(d), I might agree that the evidence was insufficient to prove that aggravated five-year [*236] felony offense. But Torres's testimony that Cinnamon might have died had she not been rescued from that car forty-five minutes before Ross's return was itself a sufficient basis on which to conclude that Ross's actions created a plain and strong likelihood of *some* harm to the animal, even if only some unquantifiable degree of suffering. *Jordan v. United States*, 269 A.2d 848, 849 (D.C. 1970) (examining whether dog was left in conditions that would "cause [it] to suffer" under animal cruelty statute). That is all that the government was required to prove for the misdemeanor offense that Ross was convicted of. *Id.*

Third, the majority relies on *Jordan, id.*, in which we reversed an animal cruelty conviction due to a lack of sufficient evidence to support it. *Ante* at 8, 19 n.8. But again, the particular facts matter a great deal to any sufficiency

windshield). The reader will also notice the direct and bright glare of the sun coming straight through the light tree cover. Further notice in Appendix C that while the trees and houses on the *opposite side* of the street are casting shadows into the street, none of the visible trees on Ross's side of the street are doing so because they are of course casting shadows in the same direction—away from Ross's side of the street. Even when viewed generously to Ross, Ross's car was receiving only a light smattering of shade from a nearby tree.

analysis, and the majority omits them. The facts in *Jordan* were that a full-grown German shepherd was left outside in roughly [**37] twenty-five degree temperatures for about five hours. We stressed that "[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that some breeds of dogs can remain exposed to extremely cold weather for many hours without injurious effects,"³ 269 A.2d at 849, as anybody who's even roughly familiar with the Iditarod knows. There is no corollary common knowledge—because it is counterfactual—that there are dog breeds that can be safely left in a car for an hour and twenty minutes in ninety-eight degree heat. They do not run a Death Valley summer Iditarod. So *Jordan* is of no help to the majority.

To be sure, a person can always be wrong in what they think to be common knowledge, so that a factfinder should always be willing to reexamine and abandon their priors in light of the evidence presented at trial. And an appeal to common knowledge generally cannot stand up against evidence that actually undermines or contradicts it. But as I have detailed above, the evidence at trial only corroborated that Cinnamon was placed in a harmful and potentially deadly situation, so there was nothing irrational about the trial court's verdict.

Let me nonetheless briefly scrutinize what I have claimed to be common knowledge, using both the [**38] relevant facts of this case and those presented in *Jordan*. I have asked ChatGPT, "Is it harmful to leave a dog in a car, with the windows down a few inches, for an hour and twenty minutes when it's 98 degrees outside?"⁴ Its response, with my emphasis added, follows:

[*237] *Yes, leaving a dog in a car under these conditions is very harmful.* Even with the windows slightly open, the temperature inside a car can quickly rise to dangerous levels. In fact, on a 98-degree day, the temperature inside a car can escalate to over 120°F (49°C) in just a matter of minutes, which can cause heatstroke or even be fatal to a dog.

Dogs can suffer from heatstroke when they are exposed to extreme temperatures, as they do not regulate heat as efficiently as humans. They rely on panting to cool down, but this becomes less effective in a hot, confined space like a car. Symptoms of heatstroke in dogs include excessive panting, drooling, weakness, vomiting, and even collapse.

For your dog's safety and well-being, it's important never to leave them in a hot car, even with the windows cracked. If you need to run errands or be in a hot environment, it's best to leave your dog at home in a cooler, safer space.

Now compare [**39] that unequivocal affirmative answer to how it responds to the facts of *Jordan*. I asked ChatGPT, "Is it harmful to leave a German shepherd outside in 25 degree temperature for five hours?" The first paragraph of its far lengthier response—which boils down to "it depends"—was:

Whether it's harmful to leave a German Shepherd outside in 25°F (-4°C) for five hours depends on several factors, including the dog's health, coat condition, and access to proper shelter. German Shepherds are a hardy breed with a double coat that provides some insulation, but prolonged exposure to cold can still be harmful. Here's what to consider:

³ It strikes me as reasonably well known that German shepherds are one of those dog breeds that endure the cold well, or at least that is fairly inferable from their heavy coats.

⁴ I do not mean to suggest that ChatGPT is a good proxy for what is, and isn't, common knowledge—it is definitely not. It can answer questions that are far from common knowledge. For instance, when I asked it what the forty-first element in the periodic table is, it responded (apparently correctly) with Niobium (Nb). But it is at least a point in favor of something being common knowledge that it is, in fact, true; and it is a far stronger point against it if it's not. Also, when I had each of my three law clerks run this same inquiry, ChatGPT gave each of them a slightly different but substantively similar answer, all beginning with an unequivocal "Yes." Because I am writing only for myself, I will not delve into the many issues and concerns surrounding using AI-powered large language models like ChatGPT in judicial decisionmaking. If this dissenting opinion had some precedential force, I would at least want to explore the value and dangers of using AI even when used only for this bit of color commentary. But for present purposes, I am content to point the reader to a thoughtful and engaging discussion on that topic, which I largely agree with. See *Snell v. United Specialty Ins. Co.*, 102 F.4th 1208, 1221-35 (11th Cir. 2024) (Newsom, J., concurring).

It then details five relevant factors that should be taken into consideration, including the dog's "health and age," its "coat condition," its "activity level," its access to shelter, and the "duration" (despite five hours being baked into the prompt).⁵

If I were to reframe ChatGPT's answers in terms of the relevant legal standards, its first answer reads to me as something like, "Yes, beyond a reasonable doubt, leaving a dog in a car for an hour and twenty minutes in 98-degree temperature is very likely to cause it harm." Its second answer, concerning *Jordan* [**40], is "you could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that leaving a German shepherd outside in 25 degree temperature is likely to cause it harm, though it possibly could depending on a host of factors." I think that aligns perfectly with what my own common sense tells me—and at least a factfinder would not be irrational in tracking those lines of thought—so that we rightly reversed the conviction in *Jordan*, while Ross's conviction should be affirmed. But I digress.

Fourth, the majority seeks to distinguish a few analogous cases from other [*238] jurisdictions where animal cruelty convictions were upheld despite the dogs in each case being left in cars for both briefer periods and on cooler days. See *City of Beachwood v. Pearl* 2018- Ohio 1635, 111 N.E.3d 620, 636-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (forty minutes in 84 degree temperature); *State v. Washburn*, 325 A.3d 136, 139 (Vt. 2024) (more than "five to ten minutes" after an officer saw the dog in "moderate distress" in 78 degree temperature); *State v. Butler*, 175 N.H. 444, 293 A.3d 191, 193-94 (N.H. 2022) (thirty minutes to an hour with the temperature "around 92 degrees outside"). Notably, it offers no analogous cases of its own where animal cruelty convictions were reversed on even roughly similar facts.

The majority attempts to distinguish the above cases on the basis that there was some evidence that the animal was in actual distress in each [**41] of them, whereas here, Torres opined that Cinnamon "looked fine" and did not appear "in distress" when he arrived on the scene. What the majority overlooks, or at least drastically downplays, is that Ross was not even halfway into her frolic when Cinnamon was rescued and Torres arrived on the scene—Cinnamon was freed roughly thirty-five minutes into Ross's hour-and-twenty minute absence. So the fact that Cinnamon did not appear to be in distress yet, shortly after being removed from Ross's car, hardly undercuts the conclusion that there was a strong likelihood that she would get there over the next forty-five minutes had she not been rescued (which is still longer than two of the cases cited above, and on par with the third). In fact, Torres testified that "excessive[] panting" is an early sign of distress in a dog, and video evidence taken several minutes after Cinnamon was removed from the car showed her to still be panting heavily. While Torres did not seem to think Cinnamon's heavy panting alone amounted to actual distress, it is certainly some support for the conclusion that she was well on her way, less than halfway into Ross's absence.

So whatever one thinks about what I have [**42] claimed to be common knowledge above, the actual and uncontradicted evidence in this case—taken in the light most favorable to the verdict—was that the temperature inside of Ross's car would have been much hotter than the 98 degrees outside.⁶ And if firefighters did not rescue

⁵ The majority suggests that ChatGPT's answer to its own question about the value of a 2002 Dodge Intrepid in 2012 is in some tension with *Long*, but it isn't. Using the majority's own Q&A, ChatGPT answered that the Intrepid's value would "likely" fall in the \$3000 to \$5000 range, but it noted that the very same factors we highlighted in *Long*—mileage and maintenance—could bring it outside of that range. By simply asking a more targeted question of ChatGPT, it confirms the point: "Would you say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an operable 2002 Dodge Intrepid would be worth more than \$1000 in 2012?" Its answer is roughly the same one we gave in *Long*. To paraphrase, it says that the car would "likely" be worth more than \$1000, "but whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt depends on factors like condition, mileage, location, and market trends at the time." Conversely, when I ask whether it can "say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that leaving a dog in a car for an hour and twenty minutes in 98 degree heat would raise a plain and strong likelihood of harming the dog," its answer is "Yes, beyond a reasonable doubt," with extensive elaboration.

⁶ While Torres said more specifically that the temperature could double inside a car depending on the time it was parked, he did not specify how much time it would take for that to occur. So I do not think one could fairly infer from his testimony that the temperatures in Ross's car might have reached double the outside temperatures (196°F) in the time she was gone. Could the temperatures in that car have gotten about halfway there, and reached into the 140°s? Sure, I would say that's within the realm

Cinnamon from the car when they did, "it could definitely have been fatal." That is more than a sufficient evidentiary basis for a factfinder to rationally conclude that Ross's actions created a "plain and strong likelihood" that Cinnamon would be harmed, and so I dissent. I would affirm Ross's conviction.

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of a reasonable inference that one could rationally draw in the government's favor on this record. But it is safer still to say only that the temperatures would have been much hotter in that car than outside of it, and I think that is sufficient to support the conviction in this case.

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

CHRISTOPHER KOHLS and MARY
FRANSON,

Case No. 24-cv-3754 (LMP/DLM)

Plaintiffs,

v.

KEITH ELLISON, in his official capacity
as Attorney General of Minnesota, and
CHAD LARSON, in his official capacity
as County Attorney of Douglas County,

Defendants.

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
EXPERT DECLARATION**

M. Frank Bednarz, **Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute, Chicago, IL**; and Douglas P. Seaton, James V. F. Dickey, and Alexandra K. Howell, **Upper Midwest Law Center, Minnetonka, MN**, for Plaintiffs.

Elizabeth C. Kramer, Peter J. Farrell, Angela Behrens, and Allen C. Barr, **Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN**, for Defendant Keith Ellison, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Minnesota.

Kristin C. Nierengarten and Zachary J. Cronen, **Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger, Minneapolis, MN**, for Defendant Chad Larson, in his official capacity as County Attorney of Douglas County.

Plaintiffs Christopher Kohls and Mary Franson (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move to exclude expert declarations offered by Defendant Keith Ellison, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Minnesota (“Attorney General Ellison”), in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 29. Recognizing errors in one of the declarations, Attorney General Ellison has moved for leave to file an amended declaration

by that expert. ECF No. 34. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Attorney General Ellison’s motion is denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Minnesota law prohibits, under certain circumstances, the dissemination of “deepfakes” with the intent to injure a political candidate or influence the result of an election. *See* Minn. Stat. § 609.771. Plaintiffs challenge the statute on First Amendment grounds and seek preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting its enforcement. *See* ECF No. 10.

With his responsive memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, Attorney General Ellison submitted two expert declarations: one from Jevin West, a Professor at the University of Washington who also serves as the Director of the Center for an Informed Public, an interdisciplinary research center dedicated to studying misinformation in the digital age (ECF No. 24 (the “West Declaration”)); and another from Jeff Hancock, Professor of Communication at Stanford University and Director of the Stanford Social Media Lab (ECF No. 23 (the “Hancock Declaration”)). The declarations generally offer background about artificial intelligence (“AI”), deepfakes, and the dangers of deepfakes to free speech and democracy. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 7–32; ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 7–23.

Plaintiffs moved to exclude these declarations, arguing that they are conclusory and contradicted by the experts’ prior writings. *See* ECF No. 30 at 9–34. Plaintiffs also alleged that Professor Hancock included fabricated material in his declaration. *Id.* at 4–9. After reviewing Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude, Attorney General Ellison’s office contacted

Professor Hancock, who subsequently admitted that his declaration inadvertently included citations to two non-existent academic articles, and incorrectly cited the authors of a third article. ECF No. 37 at 3–4. These errors apparently originated from Professor Hancock’s use of GPT-4o—a generative AI tool—in drafting his declaration. ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 11, 21. GPT-4o provided Professor Hancock with fake citations to academic articles, which Professor Hancock failed to verify before including them in his declaration. *Id.* ¶¶ 12–14.

In response, Attorney General Ellison candidly acknowledged the fake citations in the Hancock Declaration while asserting that his office had no idea that the Hancock Declaration contained fake, AI-generated citations. ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 4–6. Because the deadline to submit his response to Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion had already elapsed, Attorney General Ellison requested the Court’s leave to file an amended Hancock Declaration, citing excusable neglect to allow the late filing. ECF Nos. 34, 37 at 4–5.

Plaintiffs oppose Attorney General Ellison’s request to file an amended Hancock Declaration. ECF No. 42. Plaintiffs contend that the “excusable neglect” exception is not available to Attorney General Ellison because the substance of the Hancock Declaration would change and prejudice Plaintiffs. *Id.* at 6–10. Plaintiffs continue to maintain that the fake citations in the Hancock Declaration taint the entirety of Professor Hancock’s opinions and render any opinion by him inadmissible. ECF No. 44 at 8–9.

ANALYSIS

“[A] preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than a trial on the merits.” *Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Accordingly, courts within this Circuit have noted

that the Federal Rules of Evidence—including Rule 702 and the related *Daubert* analysis—are either relaxed, *Cooke v. Randolph, Neb. City Council*, No. 8:23-cv-249 (JMG), 2023 WL 6519374, at *2 n.3 (D. Neb. Oct. 5, 2023), or inapplicable, *USA Visionary Concepts, LLC v. MR Int’l, LLC*, No. 4:09-cv-874 (DGK), 2009 WL 10672094, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2009), at the preliminary-injunction stage. *See also* *Guntert & Zimmerman Constr. Div., Inc. v. Gomaco Corp.*, No. 20-cv-4007 (CJW/KEM), 2020 WL 6948364, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 14, 2020) (explaining that affidavits submitted at the preliminary-injunction stage “need not meet the requirements of affidavits under . . . the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Court may consider the ‘competence, personal knowledge and credibility of the affiant’ in determining the weight to give the evidence”) (citation omitted); *Parks v. City of Charlotte*, No. 3:17-cv-00670-GCM, 2018 WL 4643193, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (“[R]ather than making a final determination under Rule 702 and *Daubert* of whether [the proposed experts] qualify as experts for purposes of this trial, the Court will make a less formal review of the affidavits to see if they present the indicia of reliability common to expert testimony.”).

Plaintiffs ask the Court to undertake a full *Daubert* analysis of the West and Hancock Declarations, ECF No. 30 at 9–21; ECF No. 42 at 4–8, but because the evidentiary rules at this juncture are “less formal” than at trial, the Court declines to do so. *Camenisch*, 451 U.S. at 395. Rather, the Court will evaluate the “competence, personal knowledge and credibility” of the West and Hancock Declarations. *Gomaco Corp.*, 2020 WL 6948364, at *1. Nevertheless, the line of cases under *Daubert* remain “useful guideposts” for

evaluating the credibility of the experts' opinions. *St. Michael's Media Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore*, 566 F. Supp. 3d 327, 353–56 (D. Md. 2021).

I. West Declaration

As for the West Declaration, Plaintiffs argue that it is conclusory because it lacks a reliable methodology under *Daubert*. ECF No. 30 at 17–21. But *Daubert* does not apply with full force at the preliminary-injunction stage, *see Camenisch*, 451 U.S. at 395, and the Court is satisfied that the “competence, personal knowledge and credibility” of Professor West’s testimony weigh in favor of admitting his declaration at this early stage. *Gomaco Corp.*, 2020 WL 6948364, at *1 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as Attorney General Ellison points out, even under *Daubert*, experts may offer more “generalized testimony . . . to educate the factfinder on general principles.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. The West Declaration largely fits this mold,¹ so to the extent that Plaintiffs criticize the declaration as “conclusory” or “generalized,” the Court finds that the West Declaration is admissible for the purpose of educating this Court generally on AI, deepfakes, and the psychological and speech-related impacts of deepfakes.

The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ strained argument that the West Declaration contains legal conclusions. ECF No. 30 at 22–25. Although an expert may not testify as

¹ A portion of paragraph 23 of the West Declaration touches on applying Professor West’s testimony to the facts of this case. But the majority of that paragraph simply provides background information on the psychological impacts of deepfakes and the impact of deepfakes on the marketplace of ideas, so the Court considers this paragraph for the purpose of obtaining helpful background knowledge on these issues.

to whether “a legal standard has been met,” an expert “may offer his opinion as to facts that, if found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at issue was satisfied.” *Scalia v. Reliance Trust Co.*, No. 17-cv-4540 (SRN/ECW), 2021 WL 795270, at *19 (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2021) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs take issue with the West Declaration’s discussion of the shortcomings of counterspeech to respond to deepfakes. But whether counterspeech is effective in combatting deepfakes is not a legal standard; rather, it is a fact relevant to the ultimate legal inquiry here: the First Amendment means-fit analysis. See ECF No. 11 at 29–31 (Plaintiffs analyzing the availability of counterspeech within the means-fit analysis of their preliminary-injunction briefing). The West Declaration does not offer an impermissible legal conclusion because nowhere does Professor West testify whether “a legal standard has been met.” *Scalia*, 2021 WL 795270, at *19.

Plaintiffs finally argue that the West Declaration contradicts Professor West’s 2020 book about misinformation because in that book, Professor West purportedly dismissed the idea of regulating misinformation. ECF No. 30 at 27–30. As an initial matter, this would not justify excluding the West Declaration, as “the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility,” and “[o]nly if the expert’s opinion is so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury must such testimony be excluded.” *Hartley v. Dillard’s, Inc.*, 310 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to credibility, the Court gives little weight to Plaintiffs’ argument because Professor West’s book was written over four

years ago, and it is plausible that in the fast-changing world of AI technology, his expert opinion has evolved in that four-year gap.

Moreover, the Court discerns some selective quotation on Plaintiffs' part. For example, Plaintiffs quote a passage from the book about the regulation of misinformation: "it runs afoul of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech." ECF No. 31-7 at 12. But later in the same paragraph—in a passage that Plaintiffs do not quote—Professor West and his co-author recognize that "[f]or a democracy to function properly, a country needs an informed populace with access to reliable information," and concludes that such an argument "could justify governmental regulation of social media." *Id.* This passage alone undermines Plaintiffs' assertion that Professor West's 2020 book categorically dismisses the possibility of regulating misinformation.

In sum, the Court finds that the "competence, personal knowledge and credibility" of the West Declaration weigh in favor of its admissibility at this stage. *Gomaco Corp.*, 2020 WL 6948364, at *1. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the West Declaration—whether in whole or in part—is therefore denied. The Court will consider the West Declaration in ruling on Plaintiffs' preliminary-injunction motion.

II. Hancock Declaration

The Hancock Declaration is a different matter. Attorney General Ellison concedes that Professor Hancock included citations to two non-existent academic articles and incorrectly cited the authors of a third article. ECF No. 37 at 3–4. Professor Hancock admits that he used GPT-4o to assist him in drafting his declaration but, in reviewing the

declaration, failed to discern that GPT-4o generated fake citations to academic articles. ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 11–14, 21.

The irony. Professor Hancock, a credentialed expert on the dangers of AI and misinformation, has fallen victim to the siren call of relying too heavily on AI—in a case that revolves around the dangers of AI, no less. Professor Hancock offers a detailed explanation of his drafting process to explain precisely how and why these AI-hallucinated citations in his declaration came to be. *Id.* ¶¶ 10–22. And he assures the Court that he stands by the substantive propositions in his declaration, even those that are supported by fake citations. *Id.* ¶ 22. But, at the end of the day, even if the errors were an innocent mistake, and even if the propositions are substantively accurate, the fact remains that Professor Hancock submitted a declaration made under penalty of perjury with fake citations. It is particularly troubling to the Court that Professor Hancock typically validates citations with a reference software when he writes academic articles but did not do so when submitting the Hancock Declaration as part of Minnesota’s legal filing. ECF No. 39 ¶ 14. One would expect that greater attention would be paid to a document submitted under penalty of perjury than academic articles. Indeed, the Court would expect greater diligence from attorneys, let alone an expert in AI misinformation at one of the country’s most renowned academic institutions.

To be clear, the Court does not fault Professor Hancock for using AI for research purposes. AI, in many ways, has the potential to revolutionize legal practice for the better. *See* Damien Riehl, *AI + MSBA: Building Minnesota’s Legal Future*, 81-Oct. Bench & Bar of Minn. 26, 30–31 (2024) (describing the Minnesota State Bar Association’s efforts to

explore how AI can improve access to justice and the quality of legal representation). But when attorneys and experts abdicate their independent judgment and critical thinking skills in favor of ready-made, AI-generated answers, the quality of our legal profession and the Court's decisional process suffer.

The Court thus adds its voice to a growing chorus of courts around the country declaring the same message: verify AI-generated content in legal submissions! *See Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (sanctioning attorney for including fake, AI-generated legal citations in a filing); *Park v. Kim*, 91 F.4th 610, 614–16 (2d Cir. 2023) (referring attorney for potential discipline for including fake, AI-generated legal citations in a filing); *Kruse v. Karlan*, 692 S.W.3d 43, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (dismissing appeal because litigant filed a brief with multiple fake, AI-generated legal citations).

To be sure, Attorney General Ellison maintains that his office had no idea that Professor Hancock's declaration included fake citations, ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 4–6, and counsel for the Attorney General sincerely apologized at oral argument for the unintentional fake citations in the Hancock Declaration. The Court takes Attorney General Ellison at his word and appreciates his candor in rectifying the issue. But Attorney General Ellison's attorneys are reminded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 imposes a "personal, nondelegable responsibility" to "validate the truth and legal reasonableness of the papers filed" in an action. *Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp.*, 493 U.S. 120, 126–27 (1989). The Court suggests that an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), may

now require attorneys to ask their witnesses whether they have used AI in drafting their declarations and what they have done to verify any AI-generated content.

The question, then, is what to do about the Hancock Declaration. Attorney General Ellison moves for leave to file an amended version of the Hancock Declaration, ECF No. 34, and argues that the Court may still rely on the amended Hancock Declaration in ruling on Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion. Plaintiffs seem to accept that Professor Hancock is qualified to render an expert opinion on AI and deepfakes, and the Court does not dispute that conclusion. *See* ECF No. 30 at 4 (accepting that Professors Hancock and West “are well-published in their fields”). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that the Hancock Declaration should be excluded in its entirety and that the Court should not consider an amended declaration. ECF No. 44 at 3. The Court agrees.

Professor Hancock’s citation to fake, AI-generated sources in his declaration—even with his helpful, thorough, and plausible explanation (ECF No. 39)—shatters his credibility with this Court. At a minimum, expert testimony is supposed to be reliable. Fed. R. Evid. 702; *see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (explaining that expert testimony must be “not only relevant, but reliable”). More fundamentally, signing a declaration under penalty of perjury is not a mere formality; rather, it “alert[s] declarants to the gravity of their undertaking and thereby have a meaningful effect on truth-telling and reliability.” *Acosta v. Mezcal, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-0931 (JKB), 2019 WL 2550660, at *2 (D. Md. June 20, 2019); *see also In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.*, 722 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the “under penalty of perjury” affirmation “impresses upon the declarant the specific punishment to which he or she is subjected for

certifying to false statements”). The Court should be able to trust the “indicia of truthfulness” that declarations made under penalty of perjury carry, but that trust was broken here. *Davenport v. Bd. of Trs. of State Ctr. Comm. Coll. Dist.*, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1083 (E.D. Cal. 2009).

Moreover, citing to fake sources imposes many harms, including “wasting the opposing party’s time and money, the Court’s time and resources, and reputational harms to the legal system (to name a few).” *Morgan v. Cmty. Against Violence*, No. 23-cv-353-WPJ/JMR, 2023 WL 6976510, at *8 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2023). Courts therefore do not, and should not, “make allowances for a [party] who cites to fake, nonexistent, misleading authorities”—particularly in a document submitted under penalty of perjury. *Dukuray v. Experian Info. Sols.*, 23 Civ. 9043 (AT) (GS), 2024 WL 3812259, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024) (quoting *Morgan*, 2023 WL 6976510, at *7). The consequences of citing fake, AI-generated sources for attorneys and litigants are steep. *See Mata*, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 466; *Park*, 91 F.4th at 614–16; *Kruse*, 692 S.W.3d at 53. Those consequences should be no different for an expert offering testimony to assist the Court under penalty of perjury.

To be sure, the Court does not believe that Professor Hancock intentionally cited to fake sources, and the Court commends Professor Hancock and Attorney General Ellison for promptly conceding and addressing the errors in the Hancock Declaration. But the Court cannot accept false statements—innocent or not—in an expert’s declaration submitted under penalty of perjury. Accordingly, given that the Hancock Declaration’s errors undermine its competence and credibility, the Court will exclude consideration of Professor Hancock’s expert testimony in deciding Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction

motion. *Gomaco Corp.*, 2020 WL 6948364, at *1. Because the Court declines to consider Professor Hancock's testimony in deciding Plaintiffs' preliminary-injunction motion, the Court will deny as moot Attorney General Ellison's motion for leave to file an amended Hancock Declaration.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony (ECF No. 29) is **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**. The motion is granted as to the Hancock Declaration and denied as to the West Declaration.

2. Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Expert Declaration (ECF No. 34) is **DENIED AS MOOT**.

Dated: January 10, 2025

s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge